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Introduction 
The European Atomic Energy Community was established by a Treaty whose aim was 
to create favourable conditions for the growth of a powerful nuclear industry. Ten 
years later, however, it must be admitted that this objective is still far from being 
reached. 
It is true that Euratom's own activities have often yielded good results within the 
limits imposed on this organization, but on the whole the Community has not managed 
to co-ordinate the efforts of the member countries, even less to weld them into a 
coherent whole. 
One of the obstacles to the creation of a genuine nuclear common market is the fact 
that research and development programmes within the Community have been unco-
ordinated. Member countries have reserved appropriations and public contracts for 
their own domestic industries, and orders placed by the electricity utilities have been 
awarded solely to domestic contractors. As a result, the growth of the nuclear industry 
within the Community has not been furthered by the abolition of tariff barriers and 
quota restrictions following the coming into effect of the Euratom Treaty. 
This state of affairs has inevitably led to the present crisis, which is not confined 
to Euratom but extends to nuclear development in the Community as a whole. 
It is the aim of this report to elucidate the causes of this situation and to point out 
the lessons which emerge for future guidance. 
In the nuclear sector, it cannot be argued that the Community has not made adequate 
sums available to research. So far from this, it is surprising to note that the effort 
of the Six, on both the national and Community levels, as regards public spending on 
civilian research, has been only marginally lower than in the USA, which means 
that it has been higher in proportion to the gross national product. 
Although this fact must be treated circumspectly when it comes to assessing the 
efforts made by the US public sector since the Second World War, as well as the 
extent of privately financed research on that side of the Atlantic, it is nonetheless 
disappointing to observe that the industrial and commercial return on the financial 
outly in Europe has been so low. 
Thus, in spite of the much higher costs of conventional energy in Europe, the 
number of nuclear power stations under construction, on order or planned in the 
Community is only 16, representing some 6 500 MWe, in comparison with 87 units 
in the United States, representing some 70 000 MWe. 
From the industrial point of view, it is also noteworthy that the 87 power plants in 
the USA are being or are to be built by four or five contracting firms, whereas the 
16 units in Europe are being or are to be built by about 12 firms. The total value 
of the orders placed in the Community is less than that of the orders placed with 
each of the American firms. 
These figures afford an idea of the extent of the remedial action required in this field. 
Needless to say, a situation such as this cannot in any sense be ascribed to some 
hypothetical European inferiority in a sector which is well within the capabilities 
of European scientists. It has been caused by fragmentation of efforts the bulk of 
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which has been pursued at the national level and with national objectives in view. 
The weakness of industrial structures within the Community is in fact the result as 
much as the cause of this lack of co-ordination of officially sponsored projects. 
However, this in its turn serves to accentuate the contrast between the quality of the 
scientific work and the meagre economic return from it. 
Admittedly, in the present state of Community development, member countrks are 
inevitably concerned to pursue certain objectives of their own in the nuclear sector. 
Even so, between this present state of affairs, marked by fragmentation breeding 
wastage, and the ideal situation, where there would be only one nuclear policy in the 
whole Community, several stages are possible. What is of paramount importance as 
things now stand is that progress should be made. 
Where the Community and its Member States are concerned, progress means mapping 
out jointly what might be called a "grand strategy" for nuclear development. Despite 
the enormous complexity of the difficulties to be faced, their fundamental data can 
be stated in quite simple terms. 
1. The basic factor is nothing more nor less than the long-term necessity to make 
sure that the Community economy over the long term has the reliable and cheap 
supplies of power which nuclear energy promises to provide and thereby to open 
up a new field of industrial expansion in the Community. 
The essential requirement today for reaching this goal is a concerted effort by the 
public authorities, the electricity producers and the power plant constructors. To 
rectify the situation, it is not enough to organize research on sound lines; industrial 
structures must be modified by rationalizing the demand for nuclear power stations 
and by encouraging closer integration and specialization among enterprises on a 
multinational scale. The public authorities could usefully contribute to nuclear 
development by covering certain exceptional risks peculiar to the nuclear sector. 
2. A policy of nuclear development also involves a policy of reactor development. 
Here fragmentation is currently the most damaging factor and must be gradually 
reduced at the cost of sacrifices demanded by tough political compromises. The 
Community cannot afford the luxury of developing half a· dozen types or variants 
of the heavy-water or high-temperature advanced converter reactor up to the industrial 
stage and at the same time proceeding with two or three distinct projects in the more 
distant though promising field of fast breeder reactors. 
3. Whatever the decisions necessitated by the establishmel}t of a well-knit reactor 
development programme, there can no longer be any two opinions about the need 
to provide the Community with access to a source of enriched uranium. Thus there 
arises the problem of building in Europe an isotope separation plant which would 
be of sufficient size to produce enriched uranium at moderate cost, and by the same 
token there emerges the opportunity for joint action in a vital sector. 
4. The lack of a genuine common policy for nuclear development has produced a 
situation in which the Community is reduced to adding its own propramme to those 
of its member countries, and hence Euratom has been called a 'seventh power". 
Overall co-ordination is obviously necessary. Under Article 5 of the Treaty, this 
would mean that the Commission would receive full details of all research programmes 
drawn up in the Member States and that these programmes would be subjected to 
a searching examination so that all nuclear research in the Community became part _ 
of a single integrated programme. 
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5. The attempt to strike a balance between the benefits and sacrifices of each 
member country in the form of "fair returns" on a sectoral and budgetary basis 
resulted in abuses which are too well known to need reiteration. 
It could lead to a progressive contraction of the Communiry's activities in all fields, as 
each Member State tends to pull out of sectors offering it no great advanta~e. The 
truth is that the only satisfactory solution to the problem of "fair return' lies in 
overall compensation. 
By making use of the Treaty provlSlons concerning JOtnt enterprises, lt 1s possible 
to arrange every conceivable apportionment from among the participants, and at 
the same time ensure co-ordination of all the Member States' efforts. 
Other research projects could be made complementary programmes without the joint 
enterprise formula necessarily being employed. This should not, however, become 
a regular practice. Besides, any complementary project, whether it takes the form 
of a joint enterprise or not, should be linked to the common programme, and to this 
end it should fulfil two basic conditions: 
- effective participation by the Commission; 
- guaranteed dissemination of information, which should be as wide as possible, 
with due regard to the constraints imposed by industrial property rules. 
However, the implementation of these provisions would not obviate the risk of 
fragmentation unless they were based on a joint programme of sufficient substantial 
content to counteract any tendencies in this direction. 
6. The establishment of a single integrated policy covering all aspects of nuclear 
development could lead to the exploitation of at least part of the Community's existing 
potential on new lines. If this is done as part of an overall comparison and harmoniza-
tion, the Joint Research Centre Establishments should also participate in it. Reorgani-
zation of national or Community research bodies must not result in the sacrifice of 
basic research, essential to subsequent technical progress, or of programmes not 
concerned with electricity production (study of materials, solid-state physics, direct 
production of industrial heat, controlled thermonuclear fusion, biology, etc.). 
Nor must one rule out the orientation of certain poten_tials towards non-nuclear 
research, and in particular towards research in communications (data processing, 
computer language, systems compatibility), materials and biology, and their applica-
tions. Where the potential of Euratom is concerned, however, all this is subject to 
the prior conclusion of a legal agreement necessitated by such a reorganization 
as this. 
The lines of ~ction resulting from the proposed harmonization will guarantee the 
optimum utilization of the personnel who are the driving force behind research 
programmes in the Community and who constitute a potential the fragmentation of 
which would be highly regrettable. 
7. Concentration of efforts is insufficient in itself, however. There is a further 
need in the Community to create the most favourable conditions possible for research 
and innovation in all fields. These are problems which transcend the nuclear field, 
but which are none the less fundamental. 
There is no mobility of ideas without mobility of manpower. National barriers are 
not the only ones to blame. Other barriers should be lowered - such as those in 
Europe which still in far too many cases isolate universities, government research 
centres and individual firms, or those which stand between numerous international 
s. 9/10. 1968 7 
organizations which are financed by the same sources but which lack a common 
supervisor. 
Furthermore, projects would have to be implemented which were as vital to nuclear 
development as to scientific, technological and general industrial development, such 
as European status for companies, the elimination of administrative and fiscal obstacles 
to international mergers, the European patent and the common market for capital. 
The Commission is convinced that the continued disagreement on the future activities 
of Euratom is liable to have the most serious consequences not only in the nuclear 
sector, but also in other fields of Community activity. 
In Euratom's case, if this disagreement were to persist, it would lead to the disruption 
and cessation of Community research programmes before even the lowest level of 
co-ordination of domestic programmes could be established, and before Community 
industries in the nuclear field could be set on the road to profitability. Thus the 
wastage of public resources, and the even more reprehensible wastage of brain-power, 
would remain unchecked. At the same time, the fencing-off of the market for nuclear 
power stations would continue to hinder any competitive industrial development in 
this sector. 
Nuclear researchers would doubtless continue to make scientific and technological 
discoveries; the industry would doubtless continue to function with the aid of state 
subsidies; with government support it might even manage to have several new power 
stations installed in the grid system by domestic electricity producers, using the 
country's own type of reactor; and also it would doubtless succeed in "selling" several 
other types abroad by means of aids, guarantees and long-term credit facilities. But 
in the long run, foreign techniques would be accepted in Europe as elsewhere, by 
reason of the inherent advantages offered by the size of the national market. 
This is what is at stake for Euratom for the immediate future. Either the member 
countries make progress towards true co-operation, which is impossible without a 
certain degree of integration of efforts, or they will have to relinquish all hopes of 
holding their own in the large-scale industrial competition which in the next few 
decades will be brought about by the production and sale of super power stations. 
The Commission also feels constrained to draw the attention of the Council to the 
repercussions which the Euratom crisis could have in other fields if it were to 
continue. Inability to make progress in a sector of advanced technology where the 
basic structures are not yet wholly consolidated would certainly prejudice the chances 
of establishing a common policy for technological and industrial research and develop-
ment, both in the other leading sectors and in the traditional sectors. The dissolution 
of Euratom could even be taken as an excuse for attacking other recipients of 
Community finance. 
The aim of the first part of this document i& to develop this analysis, basing it on 
fact and taking into consideration not only the problems of research and technology, 
but also those of energy and industrial development. The second part contains the 
details of guidelines which should, in the opinion of the Commission, be adopted in 
the same sectors in order to remedy a situation which has already deteriorated to a 
dangerous extent. 
This report does not consider the other very important tasks such as education and 
training, health physics and safeguards and controls, all of which were entrusted 
to Euratom. What has been accomplished in these sectors is sufficiently satisfactory 
for the present report to confine itself to analysing the problems relating to energy, 
industry and research. 
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PART I 
Critical Analysis of Nuclear Development in 
the Community 
CHAPTER I 
ENERGY ASPECTS1 
1. Growth of energy needs in the Community 
1. For about twenty years, all six of the European Economic Community countries 
have been experiencing a steady economic expansion which has manifested itself 
largely in a rapid increase in energy consumption. In terms of primary energy, 
consumption rose from 389 million tee (tons of coal equivalent) in 1955 to 635 mil-
lion in 1967. The mean rate of growth over the whole of this period comes to about 
4.25% per year. 
It may well be asked whether this advance, a necessary condition for the maintenance 
of economic expansion and the improvement of living standards in the Community 
countries, will persist at the same pace over a fairly long period. In this event, overall 
energy consumption would reach about 1 100 million tee by 1980. 
2. In the overall energy picture, electrical energy displays particular vitality. During 
the last ten years, its rate of increase has averaged more than 7% annually, or, in other 
words, demand has doubled in ten years. All the indications are that this rate of 
growth will be maintained. If further evidence is required, per capita consumption 
in the Community countries might usefully be compared with that in the USA for 
1966, i.e., 2 120 kWh against 5 820 kWh. It follows that the share of electricity in 
the total energy consumption will rise from its present level of a quarter to a third 
in 1980. 
From 186000 million kWh in 1955, net consumption climbed to 440000 million kWh 
in 1967. It is thought that it will be of the order of 1 100 000 million kWh in 1980. 
Similarly, the primary energy required for producing the necessary electr.icity amounted 
to 100 million tee in 1955 and 165 million tee in 1967. In 1980, therefore, it should 
be approaching 350 million. When this level is attained, power plants in the 
Community will be consuming more than double the volume of fuel used at the 
present time. 
1 The Commission is here endeavouring to illustrate against a general background the different 
aspects of a nuclear policy; in this context, it has been necessary to anticipate to some extent 
the Commission's ideas on energy policy. This does not in any way mean that the Commission 
intends to adopt a sector-by-sector approach when setting forth its energy policy proposals. 
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The magnitude of the increases in demand which will have to be faced in the near 
future means that intensive use will have to be made of all sources that are available 
in sufficient quantity, are of satisfactory quality and are obtainable at reasonable cost. 
The Community will find it increasingly difficult to meet its needs from its traditional 
indigenous resources and at the same time acquire supplies on economically acceptable 
terms. In point of fact, the Community, which imports a little over half of its energy 
requirements, will be dependent on outside sources for about 55% of them in 1970, 
and perhaps as much as 62% in 1980. 
2. The contribution of nudear energy to the implementation of a 
common energy policy 
3. In this context, nuclear energy can make a tnajor contribution to the realization of 
the two primary aims of the common energy policy as defined in the "Protocol of Agree-
ment on Energy Questions" of 21 April 1964, which was adopted by the representatives 
of the Member-State governments at the Council of Ministers. These aims are: 
to secure the lowest prices, 
to guarantee dependability of supply. 
It should be emphasized that the same Protocol, referring to nuclear energy, recom-
mended that "this new energy source should be enabled to make a maximum 
contribution as soon as possible, and in economic conditions, to covering the 
Community's energy requirements." 
4. As far as electricity prices are concerned, nuclear energy is at present the only 
leading sources of electricity production in a position to ensure that prices per kWh 
will follow a downward trend in the future. 
It is now an established fact that nuclear energy can generate power cheaply and that 
its ability to compete on favourable terms with conventional sources is due to the 
large 600-800 MWe plants equipped with proven-type reactors of the present 
generation. Furthermore, it may be expected that the cost per kWh will continue to 
decrease because of the improvement potential of proven-type reactors. 
Succeeding generations of reactors, "advanced converters" and "breeders", make it 
certain that this tendency towards a reduction in the cost per kWh will be continued. 
5. On the other hand, intensive recourse to nuclear energy represents an important 
factor in dependability of supply. While nuclear energy is not an exclusively indige-
nous source, it has a considerable number of advantages compared with other energy 
sources imported for the production of electricity, notably the appreciable geographical 
diversification of supply resulting from the traditionally stable commercial relations 
which the Community enjoys with the natural-uranium exporting countries, the 
capacity of the fissionable substances in reactors to produce electricity for a fairly long 
period without refuelling and the fact that requirements of fissionable materials can 
be reduced in the medium and long term by using reactor types offering a higher 
energy yield. 
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3. Market prospects for the nuclear industry 
6. In the United States, where preoccupations with low-cost energy and supply are 
less acute than in Europe, nuclear energy shows a rapid expansion. This trend under-
lines the economic advantage of this source of energy. 
In 1966 and 1967, nearly half the power plants ordered were equipped with nuclear 
reactors. Forecasts put the installed capacity in 1980 at 170 000 MW e. Even if 
the installed nuclear capacities at present total only about 2 300 MW e ·both in the 
United States and in the Community, the capacity of the nuclear power plants under 
construction, on order or planned amounts to 70 000 MWe in the United States as 
compared with a mere 6 500 MW e in Europe. 
Nevertheless, the rising curve of electrical energy requirements on the one hand, and 
the inherent advantage of nuclear energy as a cheap and stable form of energy on 
the other, should in the normal course assure it of a considerable market in the 
Community. 
7. Despite the market prospects which lie before it, the fact has to be faced that the 
role of nuclear energy in Europe has hitherto been a very modest one. 
Accounting at it does at present for barely 2% of electricity production, nuclear energy 
is making a much smaller contribution than that envisaged a short time ago. Current 
projects awaiting completion represent as yet only a relatively minor step forward. It 
will be noted by way of comparison that in the United Kingdom 15% of electricity 
production is already derived from nuclear sources. 
4. The causes of the lag in the development of nuclear energy in the 
Community 
8. The relative stagnation of the Community in the nuclear field may be explained 
by a combination of factors, the first of which concerns the necessary scale of the 
projects. Because of the present position as regards profitability in the field of nuclear 
energy, electricity producers are obliged to consider only the installation of units with 
ratings of 600- 1 000 MW, depending on local conditions. At the same time, the 
decrease in capital costs as a result of the increase in size is more marked for 
nuclear power plants than for conventional plants. The integration of nuclear units 
of this size poses further technical and financial problems, the size of the plants being 
determined by the power and density of the distribution network. 
On· the other hand, the very structure of the electricity production industry differs 
from country to country in the Community. In two countries (France and Italy) the 
means of production are nationalized, while in the other Member States they are in 
the hands of private, public or mixed-type enterprises. 
The solution of these problems, together with the vast investments required, is 
generally beyond the scope of the regional or national bodies called upon to deal with 
them in the present circumstances. 
9. A second factor hampering development consists in the operational risks involved 
in any new technology, which in the present case are to a certain extent inhibiting the 
electricity producers from venturing into the nuclear field at this stage. Hence it is 
s. 9 I 1 o - 1 968 11 
that the reliability of nuclear installations assumes an importance equal to that of the 
level of costs, and only through the accumulation of experience at the industrial level 
will it be possible to allay this anxiety regarding operational safety. 
The uncertainty, although relative, which persists concerning the respective merits 
of various types of industrially proven reactors, as well as the much more serious 
uncertainty as to the economic advantages and the development schedule of future 
reactors, makes electricity producers delay taking decisions on investment, especially 
as the nuclear sector as a whole is experiencing rapid technical progress. 
It is in this light that one must study the problem of incorporating into the grid 
reactor prototypes which offer the best opportunities of lowering production costs. 
This necessary link between production of electricity of nuclear origin and advances 
in research calls for joint action in the field of prototypes, with a concentration of 
the efforts of the industry in the best conditions as regards the choice of techniques 
and also the still necessary backing of the public authorities. After all, it cannot 
be expected either that a single producer will bear all the risks inherent in operating 
a prototype or even, perhaps, that associations between constructors and operators can 
dispense altogether with government aid. 
10. A third factor in the delaying of orders for nuclear equipment in the Community 
consists in the uncertainties surrounding the supply of nuclear fuel. Naturally, the 
problem varies according to reactor types. It will be one of the aims of a concerted 
strategy to lessen the extent of this problem. The Community, in fact, possesses in 
its territory only a small proportion of the nuclear fuel needed to satisfy its 
requirements. 
At the same time, the portents are of a world market subjected to certain pressures 
necessitating an intensified quest for new uranium deposits. At present it must be 
admitted that the efforts of European industry in this field are not up to the scale 
of the Community's requirements. In fact, expenditure devoted to prospecting by 
Member States represents no more than roughly a tenth of world expenditure in this 
sector, while the ratio of the Community's nuclear fuel requirements to world 
requirements is of the order of one to five. 
To be assured of supplies which are consistently available in quantity and stable in 
price is a major factor in the electricity producer's decision, and as such demands 
attention. 
In addition to these considerations where natural uranium is concerned, there is the 
problem of availability of enriched uranium. At the present time, the only commer-
cially available production comes from the United States. The European electricity 
industry is looking into the technical and economic implications of such a. monopoly. 
This anxiety seems especially significant and well-founded when it is remembered 
that in 1980 nuclear energy will already account for nearly 25% of electricity production. 
Whatever the guarantees granted by the American government regarding price and 
supply, it will no doubt become apparent upon completion of the current studies 
that at least part of the Community's enriched uranium should be provided by an 
isotope separation plant set up in the Community and capable of operating at 
reasonable cost. 
11. In connection with the question of supply, the Euratom Treaty, which assigns 
to the Community the task of safeguarding the supply of nuclear fuel to Community 
users, provided for the inception of a limited common supply policy with regard to 
prospecting in the territory of Member States. 
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In addition, the Treaty set up a Supply Agency - a body empowered by a special 
status to act in commercial matters. The principal aim of the Agency was to 
guarantee users equal rights of access to the internal and external resources of nuclear 
materials. This aim was in line with the conditions of relative scarcity prevailing 
at that time. It ceased to have any relevance with the trend towards the conditions 
of plenty in the sixties and the need for long-term development of resources. 
The lack of agreement among the Member, States on the modifications to Chapter VI 
introduced by the Commission in 1965 has resulted in a deleterious suspension of 
the efforts already in progress to arrive at a common policy. 
All the Community's activities in this field must therefore be adapted to the new 
market conditions and the Community's supply requirements as soon as possible. 
This calls for both a broader and a geographically more extensive approach in the 
Community's areas of operation and the adoption of the Supply Agency as the 
commercial instrument of a common policy. 
12. As has been seen, the slowness in the development of nuclear energy is due 
principally to problems of size, supply availability and experience. 
The solution to the problems In these three categories would be considerably facilitated 
by the existence of a European-scale market for nuclear energy. What is needed is 
to initiate a series of intra-Community activities calculated to form a springboard for 
the development of genuine co-operation between the sectors concerned in the various 
countries. This would put an end to the current practice of setting up artificial markets 
solely with a view to putting pressure on known offerings, a practice which destroys 
any chance of associations and crystallizes a country's isolationist position. 
Agreement by the electricity producers of the various countries between themselves 
and with power plant constructors on the question of the phasing of their projects, 
in order to achieve the greatest possible rationalization of their orders without 
restriction at the national level, would contribute to resolving the problems set out 
above. 
13. An attempt in this direction was made by the Commission of the EAEC, who, 
in accordance with Article 40 of the Treaty, published in the journal Officiel of 
28 April its First Target Programme, aimed at specifying the nuclear energy produc-
tion goals and establishing what investments are necessary. 
Bearing in mind the recommendations of the Agreement Protocol of April 1964, 
which were aimed principally at ensuring the availability of supplies at low cost and 
on as regular and stable a basis as possible, this programme advocated the installation 
in the Community between now and 1980 of a minimum of 40 000 MWe of 
nuclear capacity, which would probably be sufficient to satisfy a quarter of the 
demand for electrical energy. This conservative estimate would mean that in 1980 
nuclear energy would be providing 8% of overall energy requirements and 25% of 
electrical energy production. According to a development model, the use of proven-
type reactors, supplemented by advanced converters and, towards 1980, the gradual 
installation of fast breeders, was envisaged. 
It would no doubt be advisable to review the details of the development model 
chosen by the Euratom Commission, but it is essential to ensure that the preparation 
of programmes of this sort fulfils the role laid down for the Commission by the Treaty, 
s. 9/10- 1968 13 
namely, to facilitate development and co-ordinate investment. dose liaison between 
the parties concerned with establishing the objectives represents a first step in this 
direction. Comparison and discussion of their projects with the Commission are in 
themselves a step towards to implementation of the aims of Article 40. 
It should be noted that, as well as its generating uses, there are other possible 
applications for nuclear energy, notably the production of heat and industrial steam 
for the heavy chemicals industry. · 
5. Conclusions 
14. The absence of an energy policy has been one of the factors in the lagging 
behind of nuclear energy. That nuclear electricity programmes have not been 
co-ordinated is a matter for legitimate regret, as this would have focused attention on 
the contribution of nuclear energy in the production of electricity. 
The resulting lack of co-operation beyond the bounds of the various public and 
private sectors has prevented a real market on a Community scale from coming 
into being. 
The operational risks which the utilities have to face stem from the advanced, 
constantly progressing technology of nuclear reactors on the one hand and the 
considerable size of the installations on the other. Whether nuclear energy will 
come into its own or not hinges entirely on the degree of sophistication achieved and 
tne guarantees of reliability that the industry will be able to confer on the design 
and construction of reactors. 
In addition, it is clear that the integration of nuclear power plants will, by virtue 
of their size, require a strengthening of transmission 'lines and an expansion of inter-
conne~ting systems. . 
With the prospect of a rapid increase in consumption of fissionable material and the 
supply problem inherent in this situation, it must be realized that the provisions of 
Chaper VI of the Euratom Treaty are scarcely appropriate. 
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Number of Power Plants 
Community USA 
17 15 
11 31 
5 56 
33 102 
COMMUNITY 
USA 
Situation at 30 June 1968 
__.__ 
"""i'""n service 
@ under construction 
~ ordered or planned 
0 Total 
MWe 
Community 
2277 
4007 
2500 
8784 
Development 
of 
USA 
2299 
22501 
47640 
72440 
Nuclear Power Plants 
NB. The area of the ctrcles 1s proportional to the power ratings (given in MWe in the table). 
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CHAPTER II 
INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
15. The previous chapter demonstrated the modest nature of the market open to 
the Community's nuclear industry until now and the hopes that may be engendered 
for it by the increase in the demand for electricity and the advantages offered by 
nuclear energy as a means of meeting it. 
The question which arises here is whether the Community's nuclear industry is in 
a position to make its contribution towards raising electricity production and to meet 
international competition. 
Answering these questions implies making an analysis of the state of the market, the 
industry and the development of nuclear technology in the Community, and this is 
the purpose of this chapter. 
The analysis will cover the present state of the market for nuclear power plants, the 
structure of the companies and the public authorities' actions aimed at sponsoring 
the industry. In each of these sections the object will be to compare the position in 
the Community with that in the United States, where the development of the produc-
tion of electricity from nuclear energy is very advanced. 
1. The state of the market and of the development of nuclear tech-
nology 
16. In reviewing the state of the market for nuclear power plants, a distinction will 
be made between those now being marketed industrially (proven-type) and those 
which have not yet reached this stage. 
Proven-type plants 
17. There are three types of plant either built or under construction in the Com-
munity, representing just over 6 300 MWe (spread over more than twenty units): 
two based on American techniques and licences (BWR and PWR), using enriched 
uranium, 
one developed virtually solely in France (gas/graphite) and using natural uranium. 
(Italy also has a gas/ graphite plant of British design.) 
18. In the United States, by comparison, only two types of plant have been built, 
are under construction or are on order, representing about 60 000 MW e, spread over 
some hundred plants (BWR and PWR) and accounting for around one-fifth of 
present installed generating capacity. Most of these plants have ratings of over 
600 MWe, and those most recently ordered, which will be handed over after 1974-75, 
are (twin or triple reactor) plants with a unit power of the order of 1 000 MWe. 
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The total value of orders exceeds $6 000 million. In contrast, orders placed in 
the Community amount to some $700 million, calculated on the same basis. 
American utilities are currently covering about half of their new capacity requirements 
by orders for nuclear plants. If this trend is maintained, it can be expected that a 
capacity of about 170 000 MWe will be installed between now and 1980. This 
growth has been made possible by the technical advances achieved by an industrial 
effort as a result of which low-cost plants with a rating of over 500 MWe and a 
load factor better than 80% are now being offered. 
The total potential Community market up to 1980 open to reactors in this category 
is about 40 000 MW e.1 
Calculated on the same basis as for the United States, this amounts to business worth 
at least 4 000 million u.a. For the Community, this potential market represents 
annual orders for four or five plants of 600 to 1 000 MWe up to 1980 (see Table I). 
19. One of the problems of reactor development in the Community lies in the 
separate emergence of two families of proven reactors (gas/ graphite and light 
water). This dual development, which is due to special situations which existed in 
the past and persists mainly for reasons relating to the supply of enriched uranium, 
has up to now prevented multinational co-operation - so important to the production 
capacity of the Community's nuclear industry - between the industries of the 
Community in the field of proven-type reactors. Gas/ graphite plants do not, however, 
appear to be competitive with light-water plants at the present time. Thus the United 
Kingdom, which also plumped for natural uranium (building 26 gas/ graphite plants 
totalling 5 700 MWe), three years ago turned to advanced gas reactors using enriched 
uranium, while at the same time the Franco-German project for a gas/graphite plant 
was cancelled. The French government is currently reviewing its future nuclear 
energy policy for the same reasons, on the basis of the report of the PEON Committee. 
Advanced (high-temperature gas and heavy-water) plants 
and fast breeders 
20. In the Community there is even greater dispersion and lack of co-operation 
between nations with regard to unproven reactors which are currently being studied 
or developed with a view to their industrial application . These break down as 
follows: 
four variants of the heavy-water reactor (heavy water/heavy water, heavy water/ 
light water, heavy water/gas, heavy water/organic); 
two variants of the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (Dragon-type and pebble-
bed reactors); 
two variants of fast reactor (sodium-cooled and steam-cooled). 
21. Heavy-water reactors: five prototype or test reactors have been built or are 
under construction (EL-4, MZFR, KKN, ESSOR, CIRENE) in the Community by 
1 In comparison it is worth noting that the Community's consumption of electrical energy is 
one-third that of the US. 
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six firms. 1 In the United States this family has been discarded by the AEC, while 
only one variant is being studied in the United Kingdom (heavy water/light water). 
Canada, on the other hand, is directing its whole programme towards this type by 
developing the heavy water/heavy water and heavy water/light water variants on an 
industrial scale. Sweden and other countries have also developed this family. 
22. High-temperature reactors: two types are being studied at the present time: 
Dragon and the pebble-bed reactor. 
A group of European firms have formed an association in anticipation of the develop-
ment and construction of Dragon-type reactors. They are the TNPG (British), 
GHH (German), Belgonucleaire (Belgian) and SNAM-Progetti (Italian). Two Ge.t:man 
firms (BBC and Krupp) have a joint interest in the pebble-bed reactor. 
Negotiations have been opened with a view to setting up a second multinational 
association concerned with this type. 
Only one firm in the United States (Gulf General Atomic) is engaged on high-
temperature reactor work. It has built a test reactor (Peach Bottom, 40 MWe), is 
constructing a 330 MWe plant (Fort St. Vrain) and recently drew up a turnkey bid 
for a 1 000 MW e plant. 
23. Fast breeder reactors: in the Community efforts are at present concentrated on 
sodium cooling, although steam cooling has not yet been discarded. Moreover, a 
commercial family of high-temperature gas thermal reactors could ultimately lead 
to high-temperature gas cooling of fast reactors. Following the joint development 
with Euratom of the RAPSODIE test reactor and the SNEAK and MASURCA critical 
assemblies, three designs are now being pursued independently. Germany, the Nether-
lands and Belgium on the one hand and France on the other are developing two 
competing prototypes: the 300 MWe SNR (Siemens, lnteratom, Neratoom and 
Belgonucleaire) and the 250 MWe PHENIX (CEA, EDF and GAAA). In addition, 
Italy has decided to construct a fuel-testing reactor (PEC). 
In the United Kingdom the construction of the 350 MWe PFR prototype reactor has 
reached a very advanced stage and a decision has been taken to go ahead with the 
construction of a 600 MW e plant. 
In the United States, which seems at present to be lagging slightly behind the Com-
munity, only three firms (General Electric on the one hand and Westinghouse and 
Atomic International on the other) are constructing two test reactors: SEFOR2 and 
FFTF.3 The active support recently extended to them by the public authorities and 
the utilities could give this sector a much-needed shot in the arm within a very 
short time. 
The USSR, for its part has decided to build a 600 MW e plant, and Japan is also 
taking interest in this type. 
24. Regarding the development of unproven reactors, the Target Programme envisaged 
a development model, still applicable, according to which advanced converters and 
breeders were to be successively brought into service after the proven-type reactors. 
1 Indatom (EL-4), Siemens (MZFR and KKN), a consortium made up of GAAA, Interatom 
and Montecatini (ESSOR) and Ansaldo Meccanico Nudeare (CIRENE). 
2 Built with backing by the Euratom/GfK Association. 
3 The FERMI reactor built by APDA should also be mentioned. 
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However, only a definite commitment on the part of industry towards the two 
families of advanced reactors (heavy-water moderated and high-temperature gas) could 
ensure them a prime position on account of their low fuel costs, the fact that little or 
no isotope separation is required and a certain potential for further development. 
Intensive development research is still being devoted to fast breeder reactors. · The 
assumption underlying the forecasts in the Target Programme, namely, that the first 
high-power fast breeders to reach the industrial stage would go into service around 
1980, remains unchanged. However, since the favourable developement of advanced 
converters appears to be a perfectly viable proposition, the competitive lead being 
predicted for the fast breeders could be somewhat reduced. 
To summarize, it may be stated that despite the appearance of a certain number of 
new trends, no new factor has arisen which is so important as to call in question the 
attractiveness of the three reactor families mentioned. 
The developme'nt cost of an independent variant, from the outset to the first of the 
line, generally runs to 500 million u.a. or more. The funds required for the industrial-
scale development of the different types of reactors and the limited size of the market 
are such that a choice must be made in order to ensure an economic return on the 
money invested. There are already plans in the Community to spend over 1 300 mil-
lion u.a. on piecemeal ilevelopment work on the various unproven reactor families. 
The fuel cycle 
25. The turnover of the companies that make up the fuel cycle industry is far from 
negligible. Thus it is estimated that, over the life of a plant, total expenditure on 
fuel is similar to, if not actually greater than, the capital costs. Accordingly, attention 
should be paid to the development of such an industry on economic grounds and for 
reasons of dependability of supply. 
This applies to the three main industrial stages of the fuel cycle, namely, the supply 
of enriched uranium, the fabrication of fuel elements and fuel reprocessing. 
a) Supply of enriched tWanium 
26. The enriched uranium used in the Community comes mainly from American 
enrichment plants. If this situation were to continue it might, in the long term, 
present serious disadvantages for the Community, notably if the United States' 
requirements were to soak up a larger proportion of their output. The construction 
of an enrichment plant,· mentioned in the previous chapter, will be possible only at 
considerable cost and this could only be contemplated on a Community basis. 
b) Fabrication of fuel elements 
27. About ten companies1 compete on this market in the Community. Their 
production is on a very limited scale. Many of them have merely carried out research 
work and have supplied only a few fuel elements for test, research or prototype 
reactors. 
1 The main firms in question are: MMN (Belgium), SICN and CERCA (France), Combustibili 
Nucleari, COREM, Fabricazioni Nucleari (Italy), NUKEM, KRT, Siemens (Germany). 
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Only the two French' companies SICN and CERCA show significant industrial 
output figures, their annual production capacity being 1 500 tons of natural uranium 
elements for gas/ graphite reactors. 
Most producers of fuel elements for light-water reactors are linked with the American 
firms General Electric and Westinghouse by licence or special agreements. Assuming 
40 000 MWe installed in 1980, their market can be estimated at 1 800 tons a year 
with a present worth of 144 million u.a. By comparison, the present market in the 
United States, divided between the five plant constructors, already has a value of 
$20 million (1968) and will run to 300 million in 1980. The American companies' 
annual production capacity with its obvious importance from the profitability stand-
point is several hundred tons of fuel per annum each. This is in contrast with the 
200-300 tons a year for all the Community's facilities. 
In conclusion it can be said that the size of the Community market is such that the 
large number of firms in the Community, if they remain dispersed, will certainly 
be unable to sustain industrial investments and to be in a position to give the 
guarantees necessary to face international competition. 
c) Fuel rept-ocessing 
28. Apart from facilities specially for the reprocessing of enriched uranium elements 
for research and materials-testing reactors (Eurex and, pardy, Eurochemic, which was 
built under OECD auspices) the Community has the following facilities for reproces-
sing the fuel elements of power plants: 
France has two industrial plants for reprocessing natural uranium elements from 
gas/graphite reactors (Marcoule and Cap de la Hague); 
the major part of Eurochemic's activities and the German W AK facility now 
under construction at Karlsruhe are for reprocessing light-water reactor fuels. 
Furthermore, the state of the reprocessing market is at present marked by very intense 
competition from companies outside the Community. The capacity of the Community's 
facilities easily meets requirements, having regard to the relatively small number of 
power plants in operation. However, a change in the situation must be anticipated 
around 1975, when additional facilities will have to be brought into service, notably 
for low-enriched uranium fuel elements, unless a severe setback to the Community's 
independence in regard to this important link in the fuel cycle is accepted. 
29. The nuclear power plant market in the Community has, therefore, the following 
salient features: 
a) a small number of plants built, under construction or ordered; 
b) a comparatively large potential market, on a Community level, for high-power 
plants but a limited one on a national level and if the number of constructors 
remains so large; 
c) a large number of reactors designed, developed and built virtually independendy 
in each country; 
d) a high level of expenditure to date in relation to the economic returns obtained. 
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2. Structure of the nuclear industries 
30. Nuclear energy is developed by close co-operation and constant interaction 
between three kinds of body, namely: 
the public authorities, as those responsible for political decisions, as budgetary 
authorities and as the operators of research centres; 
reactor constructors and component suppliers, who are also responsible for 
industrial research; 
electricity utilities as the future users of nuclear generating facilities. 
Industry's role here varies from country to country. 
31. In France, most of the work in the nuclear electricity sector has been carried 
out at the prompting of the public authorities (CEA and EDF). The choice of the 
type of reactor is made at government level. This being so, the French firms have 
come to collaborate with the authorities, which has enabled them to save by cutting 
out research of their own but makes them somewhat dependent on the authorities 
for new developments. 
The construction of eleven power plants totalling 3 500 MW e of the gas/ graphite 
natural uranium type and of several research, test and prototype reactors has enabled 
the French industry to gain great experience in the manufacture of the various 
components. 
Several firms have joined forces to build or design reactors, and this collaboration has 
resulted in the setting up of specialist consortia. 
The following are among the most important of these: 
the Groupement Atomique Alsacienne Atlantique (GAAA); 
SOCIA, formed by an association of Indatom and SEEN and comprising some 
twelve major companies; 
FRAMATOME, brought together under the aegis of the Schneider group and 
holder of a licence from Westinghouse for pressurized-water reactors; 
also noteworthy is the formation recently of the SOGERCA group, linking 
Alsthom and Hispano Alsacienne. Its aim is believed to be the negotiation of a 
licence agreement with General Electric with a view to building boiling-water 
reactors. 
The first two groups and many other French firms have taken part in the construction 
of gas/ graphite reactors and in the building of many experimental and test reactors 
of various types. In collaboration with General Electric and the Belgian firms of 
ACEC, Cockerill Ougree and MMN, Framatome was architect-engineer for the 
266 MW e Chooz plant. ·In addition, GAA formed an association with Interatom 
(Germany) and Montedison (Italy) for the design of the ORGEL family and the 
building of the ESSOR reactor; Indatom built the EL-4 heavy water/ gas reactor. 
32. In West Germamy, the reactor constructors (AEG, GHH, Siemens, BBC-Krupp, 
Interatom) are largely responsible for the development of those reactors financed 
mainly from public funds. 
AEG and Siemens offer plants at fixed prices, on a turnkey basis. They act as 
independent architect-engineers and provide the required guarantees. These firms are 
linked by contract (licence or licence-exchange agreements, technical assistance) with 
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big American firms. Through these contracts, whose conditions they try to improve 
by technical progress of their own, they were able to build the first power plants 
installed in Germany. 
Siemens has concerned itself particularly with the pressurized light-water family. ' 
This firm has also undertaken the development of two designs of heavy-water reactor. 
AEG constructs boiling-water reactors. 
BBC-Krupp and GHH-MAN are concerned with high-temperature reactors; the former 
is developing the pebble-bed design and the latter is part of the Internuclear group. 
The utilities are privately owned and in general have not contributed towards reactor 
development. 
The public authorities have encouraged, and thus made generally possible, the 
construction of nuclear power plants (KRB, KWL and KWO) and of· test or proto-
type reactors (MZFR, AVR, KKN, KNK) by subsidizing development and construc-
tion work and by underwriting any operating losses that may be made by the 
utilities. 
33. In Italy, several industrial firms have entered the nuclear field. Three groups 
have now been formed: 
- . the first has been set up around the State holding company EFIM and is 
associated with Fiat through Breda Elettromeccanica under the agreement between 
Fiat and Westinghouse covering the construction of pressurized-water reactors; 
- the second group was formed under the aegis of the IRI through its subsidiaries 
(Progettazioni Meccaniche Nucleari Spa, Ansaldo Meccanico Nucleare Spa and Fabbri-
cazioni Nucleari Spa), which are associated with General Electric (US) for the 
construction of boiling-water plants; 
- the third group is centred on the State-owned corporation ENI with its 
subsidiaries SNAM Progetti and Nuovo Pignone; SNAM Progetti is engaged, in 
association notably with TNPG (British), on the construction of gas/graphite, advanced 
gas and high-temperature reactors. 
Also noteworthy is the participation of Montecatini (co-founder of Sorin with Fiat 
and, with Edison-Volta, of CISE) in the construction of ESSOR and the design of 
the ORGEL prototype. 
34. In Belgium, the firms concerned in nuclear development form part of the groups 
controlled by the large financial holding companies (Societe Generale de Belgique, 
Cofinindus-Brufina, Electrorail). 
This applies in particular to ACEC, Cockerill-Ougree, Belgonucleaire and MMN. 
ACEC, Cockerill-Ougree and MMN have formed an association with Framatome 
(France) and Westinghouse (US) for the construction of the Chooz 266 MWe 
pressurized-water plant. 
Belgonucleaire, which is currently setting up a design department, has until now 
devoted its main activities to fast reactors (it is taking part in the SNR prototype 
project) and the development of a medium-power variable-moderation reactor 
(VULCAIN). This firm has also built up a capability in the manufacture of plutonium-
based fuels and is part Qf the Internuclear group. · 
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35. In the Netherlands, the industry seems to have opte.t for a sub-contracting policy, 
at least where the market for proven-type reactors is concerned. It concluded special 
agreements with foreign companies for the construction of the Dodewaard plant. 
At the same time it aims at the market for major components and has even succeeded 
in penetrating the American market. 
The firm of Neratoom, which is made up of the nuclear interests of several powerful 
firms (Philips, RDM, Stork, etc.), is involved in the SNR prototype fast reactor 
project as part of a Belgian-German-Dutch industrial consortium. 
Lastly, the firm of KEMA is developing a homogeneous suspension reactor based 
on the uranium-thorium cycle. 
36. If the role of industry differs from country to country, the size of the firms, 
in terms of finance and production capacity, is also very variable (see Table II). 
Only the two large German electrical firms of Siemens and AEG come close to the 
two large American companies of Westinghouse and General Electric as regards size 
and product range. With their parent firms, the two French companies (GAAA and 
SOCIA) are appreciably smaller. 
As for the Italian companies, they are major industrial set-ups in terms of turnover 
and manpower but hitherto they have made little effort to develop their activities 
in the nuclear field. 
Apart from very large firms- it seems that, on their own, the Community companies 
have difficulty in financing technological development programmes spreading over 
several generations of reactor families and in pursuing an aggressive sales policy, such 
as is practised by the American companies, in view of the financial risks involved in 
the construction and guaranteed operation of the high-power reactors demanded for 
reasons of competitiveness. 
With regard to those major firms which have a broad enough financial base to roll 
with any punches, the fragmented nature of the market and the resultant poor 
prospects for orders have not in general encouraged them to invest on a large scale 
and to build up their nuclear divisions to a significant size. 
Finally it must be noted that four of the firms (Siemens, ACEC, Framatome and 
Fiat) have links with Westinghouse and two (AEG and Ansaldo, with perhaps 
a third soon, GAAA) with General Electric, which is likely to restrict the action of 
each party concerned. 
37. The last few years have seen certain mergers in the nuclear industries. Thus: 
- In West Germany the number of firms doing nuclear work is on the decline. 
There are moves towards co-operation and link-ups: co-operation between BBC and 
Krupp as BBK; merging of the reactor development departments of GHH and MAN; 
merging of reactor development work by DEMAG and North American Aviation 
and later Babcock Wilcox under lnteratom. 
- In France mergers have produced two groups: SOCIA and GAAA. 
There is also a trend, still e>onfined to specific projects, towards co-operation between 
companies of different nationalities. The following may be mentioned: 
- co-operation between the CEA and French reactor constructors, on the one hand, 
and Siemens on the other, with a view to developing heavy-water moderated, gas-cooled 
and heavy-water cooled reactors; 
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co-operation between GAAA, Interatom and Montecatini on the ORGEL 
project; 
- co-operation within Internuclear by the firms of Belgonucleaire, GHH, SNAM-
Progetti and TNPG (and possibly GAAA, too) in drawing up the bid for a Dragon-
type reactor; 
- co-operation between Siemens, Interatom, Belgonucleair~ and Neratoom with a 
view to developing a sodium-cooled fast breeder reactor. 
Praiseworthy as they are, however, these mergers and similar moves do not appear 
adequate to meet the demands of the market and allow the nuclear industry to 
develop in the Community, for the following reasons: 
1) As has been stated already, nuclear energy only becomes competitive at high 
ratings (between 600 and 1 000 MWe, depending on local conditions). As a result, 
the number of reactors to be built is limited and the constructors must have a very 
sound financial and technical base in view of the risks involved in the construction 
and operation of such plants. 
2) Each national market is too small for research and development costs to be 
amortized over a sufficient number of orders. Only the sale of a large number 
of plants (five to ten units, according to Mr. W.E. Johnson, a member of the US 
Atomic Energy Commission) can provide industries with sufficient business to recoup 
this cost, reduce prices and make nuclear plarits competitive with conventional ones. 
Such a volume of orders could only be obtained on a national basis at best over' a 
very long period of time and within a protected economy. 
38. Furthermore, if each industry were to remain confined to its home market it 
would have to continue largely to rely on a licence system imposed by powerful 
foreign companies.1 While certain licencees have gradually achieved greater independ-
ence with respect to their American partners, nonetheless the licencee generally lags 
behind its partner and has no opportunity, at least in the first few years, to profit 
by the particularly good openings in the market. Moreover, the licencer usually 
endeavours to limit the selling area for the products built under licence and thus 
prevent the creation of a large market for them. 
39. However, multinational co-operation or mergers are essential to the creation of 
a genuine nuclear common market. The member countries admittedly abolished all 
customs duties on imports and exports, or taxes with equivalent effect, and all 
quantitative restrictions on both imports and exports in respect of nuclear products 
back in 1959, but in view of the preponderant influence wielded by the public 
authorities in the nuclear industry field, the abolition of customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions was not enough to ensure the free circulation of goods within the 
Community in this particular market. This is because each country wishes its home 
industry to develop and to benefit from its spending on research and development. 
Moreover, even the Community market is large enough to warrant competition 
between a large number of firms and allow them to face up to international 
competition. The proof of this lies in the fact that there are some twelve reactor 
manufacturers in the Community, only eight of which have as yet built a nuclear 
plant of at least 150 MW e, chasing a volume of orders which, in terms of the total 
1 Here it may be remarked that it has not hitherto been possible to initiate co-operation 
between European holders of licences granted by the same American firm. 
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value of nuclear plants under construction or the subject of firm orders, represents 
only about 11% of the corresponding value in the United States. It should be noted 
that four firms, perhaps five in the future, will divide up the American market 
between them. 
As for the international market, it can only be tackled on the basis of a large number 
of orders - this alone can enable competitive prices and impressive references to 
be quoted. 
Lastly, the supply of fissionable materials from Community sources will be possible 
only at considerable cost and this would not be economically justified on a national 
scale. 
40. The structure of the Community's nuclear industries is therefore characterized by: 
the large number of contending industries; 
the lack of a genuine industrial common market, in particular as regards orders, 
despite the abolition of internal customs duties and quantitative restrictions; 
the paucity of the companies' capital resources in relation to the amount of the 
guarantees required on the construction and operation of reactors; 
the virtual absence of trans-national integration between constructors of the same 
type of reactor and the same fuel elements; 
very tough competition from industries outside the Community. 
3. The involvement of the public authorities in the Community 
41. The public authorities in the Community (both of the Member States and of 
Euratom) have played a major part in the development of nuclear electricity. 
Their involvement has taken different forms, varying with the country. Mention may 
be made of direct or indirect financial assistance to constructors and to utilities, the 
placing of orders with industry and thereby, indirectly, industrial reorganization, 
research and design work entrusted to government establishments, and the deter-
mination of which reactor families to design and develop. To these involvements in 
a purely national sphere, which are not co-ordinated, have been added those of 
Euratom. These latter include not only the awarding of research contracts or orders 
to private industry, on both the Community and national levels, but also projects of 
a more promotional nature: · 
the Euratom/US Agreement for Co-operation of 8 November 1958, which included 
a power reactor programme involving three plants (ENEL/Garigliano, SENA 
and KRB; 
the granting of "joint enterprise" status (pursuant to Chapter V of the Euratom 
Treaty) to four nuclear power plants (SENA, KRB, KWL and KWO); 
the programme of participation in power reactors covering five plants (ENEL/ 
Garigliano, Latina, SENA, KRB and GKN), for a total amount of 32 million u.a. 
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In the critical first years of the development of nuclear energy, these three projects 
prompted the electricity utilities to build and operate large nuclear plants and thus 
provided orders for the Community's reactor constructors, often enabling them to 
enter this new field of production for the first time. 
One not inconsiderable factor in the subsequent development of the nuclear industries 
has been the institution of a general scheme for the exchange of experience, linked 
with the three projects mentioned above, as a result of which it has been possible to 
benefit from the knowhow acquired during the building and operation of these plants, 
thus obviating difficulties in the construction of further reactors of the same family. 
An attempt is made below to analyse spending on promotion of the industry. The 
analysis deals with each family of reactors in turn, a distinction being made between 
funds allotted directly at national level and those channelled through Euratom. 
The figures given, however, are subject to major reservations in view of the difficulty 
in separating the proportion of the funds devoted to industrial promotion from that 
allocated to basic research. 
A. Proven reactors 
1) The grJJ/graphit.e family (France, Italy and Euratom) 
42. Of the Community countries, only France has spent very large sums on the 
implementation of its nuclear power plant programme. Although precise figures are 
not available, a reasonable estimate is that France has invested several hundreds of 
millions of u.a. in its development programme for this type of reactor. 
The Commission's activity in the field of natural uranium gas/graphite reactors dates 
only from 1963 and covers a research and development programme of the order of 
6 million u.a. and a 4 million u.a. contribution to the Latina plant (built in Italy to 
a British design), earmarked for the fabrication of the fuel elements on a Community 
basis. 
2) The light-water family (all the Community countries and Euratom) 
43. Euratom has contributed towards the development of light-water reactors in the 
Community in several ways: 
i) by awarding research contracts 
a) as part of the Joint Programme under the Euratom/US Agreement. Since 
this came into force at the beginning of 1959, the Commission and the USAEC 
have devoted 28 million u.a. to research contracts placed in the Community and 
in the United States; 
b) as part of its own programme, to the amount of about 4 million u.a.; 
ii) as part of the programme of participation in the KRB, ENEL/Garigliano, SENA 
and GKN power reactors. The European Community has· made provision in this 
way for the expenditure of 28 million u.a. representing participation in: 
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charges incurred by the contractor owing to the short-fall in energy production, 
the manufacturing cost of certain reactor parts; 
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iii) by granting four companies (SENA, KRB, KWL and KWO) joint enterprise 
status. In this way the Belgian and German companies which would not otherwise 
have been exempted from direct taxation, like the electricity producers of the other 
Member States, received tax concessions which are difficult to quantify but have been 
estimated in the case of the KWO plant at 5-8 million u.a. 
Over the first ten years of the existence of the European Atomic Energy Community, 
the Commission has spent a total of 60 million u.a. on the development of light 
water reactors. The Member States, particularly Germany, Belgium and the Nether-
lands, have allocated large sums to this sector under their national programmes. 
Although it is hard to obtain sufficiently accurate information, the data which is 
available shows that the spending at national level is much greater than the funds 
placed' at the disposal of the Community. This may be illustrated by the fact that 
in their 1966 and 1967 budgets the above three countries allotted between 21 and 
19 million u.a. respectively to the development of light-water reactors and associated 
industrial activities (these figures do not include the assistance provided by the 
German government in covering the fiqancial risks inherent in a possible protracted 
outage of the KRB and KWO reactors, for example). 
Lastly, on the basis of the information available, it may be felt that the French and 
Italian Governments have put very littlt; if any, funds into this form of activity. It 
is pointed out, however, that the CEA has developed a pressurized water reactor under 
its military programme. 
B. Unproven reactors 
1) The heavy-water family 
• Heavy water/gas (Germany and France) 
44. Only France and Germany have taken an interest in this family, building the 
EL-4 reactor (financed by CEA-EDF) and the KKN reactor (financed by the German 
government through the GfK), investments being estimated at more than 
130 million u.a. 
The fuel cans for this type of reactor have still to be developed, research having been 
unsuccessful up to now, so that for the time being no large-scale project can be 
contemplated. 
• ORGEL (Euratom) 
45. Euratom has spent a very large amount of money on this family (80 million u.a., 
of which 16 million under the first five-year programme), to which must be added 
a major part of the cost of the work carried out at the Ispra Centre - estimated at 
about 60%. The results of the Orgel competition for bids, which is now in progress, 
will enable a decision to be taken on the desirability of commencing construction of 
a prototype reactor. 
Three firms in the Community have shown their interest in this reactor from an 
industrial standpoint by entering for the competition. 
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• Heavy water/heavy water (Germany) 
46. Only the German firm of Siemens has developed this family, building the 
MZFR, financed by the German government through the "Gesellschaft fiir Kern-
forschung" (GfK), a company incorporated under private law. The investment 
expenditure on this reactor amounts to about 39 million u.a. Its development led 
recently to a 318 MWe plant being exported to the Argentine. 
• Heavy water/light water (Italy and Euratom) 
47. This type of reactor was first developed by the CISE, Italy (first under a Euratom 
contract alone and later under a Euratom-CNEN contract). The CNEN and ENEL 
have decided to build a 35 MWe prototype reactor (CIRENE) on which the develop-
ment expenditure will be around 20 million u.a. 
Euratom's contribution to the implementation of this research programme has amounted 
to about 6.2 million u.a. 
2) The high-temperature gas family (Germany and Euratom) 
48. Under its THTR Association and the Dragon project Euratom has contributed 
a total amount of 45 million u.a. to the research and development budget. 
The German government's contribution towards the cost of building the Jiilich 
reactor (AVR) amounts to some 17 million u.a. out of a total of 25 million. 
3) Fast breeders (all the Community countries and Euratom) 
49. All the Community countries have an interest in the development of the fast 
breeder family. Up to the end of 1967 all the work was carried out under contracts 
of association with Euratom, which contributed 95 million u.a. towards the expenditure, 
accounting for about 3 5% of the total. 
50. Have the results obtained justified the large appropriations of funds for such 
projects? 
1) Only over the long term will it be possible to judge the profitability of the 
funds sunk in the development of reactors, so it cannot be estimated at present. 
In connection with the preparation of the First Target Programme, the Commission 
made a calculation of the savings resulting from the gradual introduction of proven-
type reactors, advanced converters and fast breeders in the Community's electricity 
grids in comparison with a generation programme not making use of nuclear energy. 
It emerged that, in the most unfavourable conditions for nuclear energy, the saving 
at present prices will top the 20 000 million u.a. mark by the ,end of the century and 
will therefore be much greater than the expenditure incurred in the development of 
these new techniques. 
2) The fragmentary nature of the.se projects is inescapably obvious, since they have 
never formed part of a general policy in regard to reactor types. This explains the 
limited impact of Euratom's activities in the field of industrial promotion. France, 
for example, declined to draw on the funds budgeted for the programme of contracts 
of participation for the gas/graphite plants built within its bord~rs. 
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Not all the paths opened by the Euratom/US Agreement for Co-operation could be 
explored, notably in the case of the power plant programme. 
The joint enterprise concept has not been developed in all the ways foreseen by the 
authors of the Treaty. 
National projects have not been co-ordinated with each other, leading to the design 
and development of a large number of reactor types using identical or different 
technology. · 
While it may appear technically justified and economically defensible for the 
Community to design and build several large prototypes of different families, in view 
of the relatively small cost involved in relation to the amounts already spent, it would 
be unwise from the economic and industrial angle to develop all the types to the 
industrial stage. A fair return on the considerable funds required in order to reach 
the industrial stage could by no means be guaranteed because the market open to 
the industries from the sale of six or seven different reactor types would be too 
narrow to give them any prospect of commercial success. 
A choice must therefore be made forthwith and others will have to be made shortly. 
4. Conclusions 
51. The analysis carried out in the foregoing sections leads to the following 
conclusions: 
1. Despite the small number of plants built or on order in Europe (20 plants repre-
senting 6 000 MW e in comparison with about a hundred plants built, under 
construction or on order in the United States, representing around 60 000 MWe), 
three types of "proven" reactor have been used in the Community, two under American 
licences (.r;epresenting 3 400 MWe) (see Chapter 11.1 above). 
With only one exception- the Chooz plant built by the ACEC-Framatome-Westing-
house group - these projects were completed and the calls for bids issued on a purely 
national basis. Thus some twelve firms (as opposed to four in the United States) 
have divided up the small European market between them (see Chapter 11.2 above). 
This dispersion is even more marked in~ the case of unproven reactors, seven or eight 
types of which are currently being designed or developed in the Community with a 
view to industrial application (see Chapter 11.1 obove). 
Finally, special fissionable materials have been obtainable only by ordering from 
countries outside the Community (United States or Britain). 
2. The small number of orders placed with the Community's national industries has 
not encouraged them either to invest heavily or to join forces except by way of 
temporary link-ups.1 
1 There has recently been an exception in the form of Internuclear. 
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The industries of the Community, therefore, have often been content to build up fairly 
small staffs of engineers and research workers and to live in hope rather than adopt 
an aggressive approach. 
These half-measures have in turn tended to strengthen the posttton of competing 
industries outside the Community and to diminish the likelihood of competitive 
reactors being produced. 
3. Since the development of a given reactor family up to the commercial application 
stage demands an investment in terms of time and capital that is beyond the capability 
of the private sector, the public authorities have had to take over much of the financing 
necessary for the development of reactor technology (see Chapter 11.3). 
In the Community this, considerable outlay by the public authorities has been made 
largely on a national basis and was in most cases devoted to developing families of 
identical or different technology. If this situation does not change, this will result 
in the market being fragmented for good and will lead to obvious duplication of 
effort and unnecessary competition, rendering the economic yield of the funds spent 
extremely questionable. 
4. Only very large multinational firms or groups of firms will in the future be 
capable of meeting the. utilities' requirements, which at the Community level are 
probably large. At the present time, however, owing to the scattered nature of public 
spending, the fnrgmentation of the European market and the resultant absence of 
initiative, the European industry cannot gird itself for tomorrow's markets, either the 
Community's or external ones, or withstand foreign competition. 
The present situation is therefore a vicious circle, both for those states which have 
already spent considerable amounts and will have to incur major expenditure for many 
years to come in order to sustain the development of nuclear energy, and for the 
electricity producers, who have no guarantee of the satisfactory operation of their 
nuclear plants, as well as for the firms which, competing as they are in a small, badly 
organized market, cannot for lack of sufficient orders and prospects of orders spread 
investment and design expenditure over many years, hesitate to take risks and fight 
among themselves for subsidies. 
Hence it does not appear possible for the Community to postpone any longer the 
industrial consummation of the very costly research policy that it has pursued hitherto. 
Having regard to the American lead, to delay any longer would deprive it of any 
prospect of success and would to a great extent nullify the benefits to be gained 
from the research effort. 
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Table I 
Number of plants to be installed annually up to 1980 
(according to the programme calling for 40 000 MWe from nuclear power in 1980) 
Cumulative nuclear Generating Number of plants 
generating capacity to be installed 
capacity to be installed 
to be installed each year 
I 
600MWe 1 000 MWe 
(MWe) (MWe) (approx.) (approx.) 
1970 4 000 
2 000 3 
6 000 
2 300 4 
8 300 
2 600 4 
10 900 
2 900 5 
' 13 800 
3 200 5 
1975 17 000 
3 600 4 
20 600 
4 100 4 
24 700 
4 600 4 
29 300 
5 100 5 
34 400 
5 600 5 
!980 40 000 
Total 21 X 600 22 X 1 000 
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Table II 
Size of the main firms engaged in the nuclear field 
Firm Manpower Turnover in (thousands) million u.a. 
USA 
General Electric 375 7.74 
Westinghouse 132 2.90 
Gulf Oil 58.3 4.20 
Combustion Engineering 29.8 0.69 
Babcock & Wilcox 28.8 0.625 
WEST GERMANY 
Siemens 242 1.98 
AEG 135 1.29 
BBC-Krupp (123) (1.54) 
GHH 71.6 1.05 
Interatom 1 32.0 0.36 
FRANCE 
GAAA (26.9) (0.30) 
SOCIA (160) (2. 7) 
BELGIUM 
ACEC (group) 14.9 0.23 
Belgonucll~aire 0.3 not given 
NETHERLANDS 
Neratoom (288.9) (2. 76) 
ITALY 
Fiat 146 1. 91 
ENI group 55.6 1.10 
Montecatini-Edison 128 2.08 
IRI 283 3.24 
The figures between brackets relate to the parent companies. 
1 These figures relate solely to those of the parent companies having their registered office in Europe. 
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CHAPTER III 
ASPECTS OF RESEARCH ACTIVITY 
1. The Community's research effort in the nuclear field 
52. The avowed aim of the European Atomic Energy Community is to form a model 
of scientific and industrial co-operation in a pioneering sector and to contribute to 
the creation of the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of 
nuclear industries. 
An analysis of the development of nuclear research in the Community shows that, in 
the light of the results, this aim has not been satisfactorily achieved. 
53. The Member States have devoted approximately 650 million u.a. to the financing 
of the first two Euratom five-year research programmes. From the table it can be 
seen that for the year 1967 alone the Member States spent an equivalent sum on the 
development of their domestic programmes. It is noteworthy that Euratom's annual 
budget remained virtually unchanged (90 million u.a.) over the period 1963-67, 
whereas the funds made available for the Member States' own programmes increased 
considerably. Thus the appropriations for the Community research in 1967 represented 
only about 12% of the total nuclear spending of the six countries concerned. For 
guidance, the table below also gives the corresponding figures for Britain and the 
United States. 
Table I 
Appropriations made by the Member States (domestic programmes only), Britain and 
the United States to research as a whole and to the nuclear sector 
Total public Ap)fopriatlons to nuclear 
expenditure & D for peaceful 
on nuclear purposes 
and non-nuclear 
R&D I (million u.a.) (million u.a.) %of total 
Belgium 103 27 25.3 
France 1 805 336 19.8 
Italy 230 75 32.6 
Luxembourg _l 0.5 -
Netherlands 220 21 9.5 
West Germany 1 200 187 15.5 
Community 3 558 647 18.3 
United Kingdom 1 450 131 9.0 
United States 16 152 937 5.8 
1 This figure was not available. 
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It may further be worthwhile to show the funds devoted by the Member States to 
Community nuclear research as a proportion of the total appropriations for all 
Community activities. Table II illustrates the relevant position for the year 1968. 
Table II 
Resources made available by the Member States for all Community activities in 1968 
Item 
- Communities operating budget 
- European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund 
- European Social Fund 
- European Development Fund 
- Euratom research budget 1 
- ECSC research and reorganization 
Total 
Amount 
million u.a. 
107.2 
1 678 
24.6 
110.4 
84 
26 
2 030.2 
Contribution 
in% 
5.3 
82.7 
1.2 
5.4 
4.1 
1.3 
100 
' Includes an amount of 41 million u.a. which, pending agreement on the research programme carried out under contracts 
of association, is being borne by the Member States. 
54. From Tables I and II the following conclusions can be drawn: 
1) The aggregate sums devoted by the Member States in 1967 to financing their 
respective national programmes - about 650 million u.a. - and their contribution to 
the international organizations (CERN, ENEA, IAEA, Eurochemic) and to Euratom-
in all about 150 million u.a. - amounted to a total of roughly 800 million u.a.; 
2) In absolute terms, the Community's total nuclear budget is equivalent to about 
80% of that of the United States; in relative value, it represents more than 20% of 
the Community's total public expenditure on research and development, whereas in 
the United States the nuclear contribution amounts to only about 6%; 
3) The Euratom budget accounts for less than 4% of the whole expenditure devoted 
to Community activities. It must be noted that the absence of an agreement on the 
financing of the research programmes covered by the contracts of association (indirect 
action) - not including the extension of the Dragon project - reduced Euratom's 
research budget for 1968 to roughly 43 million u.a., thus bringing the latter's contri-
bution down to about 2% of the total expenditure on Community activities (Table II). 
It should further be noted that the Benelux countries' financial participation in the 
Joint Research Programme represents a far higher percentage of their overall research 
budget than that of the other Community countries. Consequently, the programmes 
of the smaller countries are more strongly influenced by the Community programme, 
without being more closely integrated. 
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The fact that the American nuclear research programme covers advanced sectors 
such as high-energy physics and modern biology with substantially greater resources 
than the Community's and includes such fields as nuclear propulsion for space devices 
and the use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, which are not even touched 
upon in Europe, prompts the conclusion that, in certain sectors at any rate, the 
Community spends very large amounts, equal if not superior to the American figures. 
Yet, in spite of these efforts, nuclear development has still not reached a very advanced 
level of industrialization in the Community. 
Why, in the field of research, the setting up of a nuclear Community centred on the 
pooling of the member countries' efforts has not produced the accelerating effects 
expected of it is a question that calls for examination. 
2. Euratom's action in the field of nuclear research 
55. With regard to nuclear research, Euratom has a twofold duty, namely: 
to concert, co-ordinate and further research work undertaken in the Member 
States (Articles 5 and 6); 
to prepare and imple~ent a Community programme (Article 4). 
An analysis of the positive results and of the difficulties encountered by the Commis-
sion in carrying out these tasks is of major interest as a basis for preparing proposals 
for Euratom's future activities. 
Co-ordination of research programmes 
56. The experience acquired during Euratom's ten years of operation has shown that: 
- the effort to confront and co-ordinate the national research programmes has so 
far had a limited effect in the technological sectors; on the other hand, it has been 
appreciated in certain fields concerning basic research or very long term objectives; 
- in so far as a confrontation and co-ordination policy has been carried out in 
line with Article 5 of the Treaty, it has met with great difficulties. 
Any action to dovetail research programmes must start with an inventory of the means 
available. Consequently, acting under Article 5 of the Treaty, the Commission started 
off in 1958 with a first overall census of the research projects under way both in the 
nuclear centres and in industrial and university laboratories. 
The first stage of this survey enabled it to draw up a satisfactory balance-sheet of 
programmes. The follow-up action, however, intended to keep it up-to-date - and 
therefore efficacious - was unsuccessful. In order to close the gaps, co-ordination at 
the large-scale research level was sought within the Liaison Committees or Consultative 
Committees that head the Community programmes dealing with similar subjects and 
carried out under contracts of association (fusion, biology, fast reactors, high-temper-
ature graphite/gas reactors, materials-testing reactors, etc.) and by the Joint Research 
Centre (chiefly heavy-water moderated reactors). 
The results obtained were favourable and well received in the basic research sectors 
(e.g., fusion and biology), whereas they were far more fragmentary in the programmes 
dealing with technological development. 
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It was hoped that with the setting up, in 1961, of the Consultative Committee on 
Nuclear Research (CCNR), that body would become the permanent organ for 
concerting the Community's research programmes. Although the different delegations 
have sometimes supplied information on the course of certain of their research 
programmes, it has never been possible to obtain genuine discussions in the CCNR 
at the preparatory rather than the completed stage of programmes. 
57. Consequently, although it is true that the Community has been fully informed 
about the national programme in which it took any part, it is equally true that hitherto 
it has not been afforded a full view of the whole of the research activities undertaken 
in the Member States. If this situation were to continue into the future, the Commis-
sion would be without the essential means -of carrying out the duty vested in it by 
the Treaty. 
The very relative success of the measures to co-ordinate the research programmes 
largely accounts for the poor yield from research when it reaches the industrial stage, 
and this in spite of the considerable funds devoted to it . 
. 
The first thing needed today, then, is not so much to increase nuclear research and 
development spending in the Community as to rationalize it and set up procedures 
to bring about a better balance amongst the different sectars of advanced technology. 
With this in view, the Commission considers it imperative to strengthen its programme-
co-ordinating measures appreciably, not only through its own research activities but 
by resorting formally to the procedure laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty. 
Role of the Community research programme 
a) Budget items 
58. As already stated, the total expenditure on the Community research and develop-
ment programme over the period 1958-1967 amounts to some 650 million u.a. 
Table III shows the breakdown of these appropriations amongst the principal 
activities under the different Community programmes. 
59. The details set out in Table III show that: 
1) Roughly a quarter of the appropriations were devoted to investments and operation 
of the JRC establishments, whilst the remainder served to finance the various 
programmes carried out under research or association contracts. 
2) Allowing for the fact that about half the JRC staff is engaged in research of a 
technological nature, the sum of the appropriations devoted to the reactor development 
programmes and allied sectors represents roughly 70% of the overall budget. 
In addition, it should be noted that the amount spent on public service activities was 
low. These mainly concerned instruction, the dissemination of information, the 
CBNM programme, certain CETIS activities, and research on radiation protection. 
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Table III 
Total appropriations under Community research budgets in the period 1958-1967, 
itemized according to main activities 
Subject 
Direct action 
Investments and operation of the four JRC 
establishments 
Indirect action 
· - proven-type reactors 
light-water reactors (60 million u.a.) 
nat. uranium graphite-gas reactors (9 mil-
lion u.a.) 
- heavy-water-moderated reactors 
organic liquid coolant 
(ORGEL project + work conducted at 
Ispra US) 
boiling light water coolant 
(CIRENE) (6.4 million u.a.) 
- suspension reactor (SUSPOP) 
- high-temperature graphite-gas reactors 
Dragon (34.4 million u.a.) 
THTR (10. 9 million u.a.) 
- fast reactors 
- marine propulsion 
- related sectors (irradiated fuel reprocessing, 
waste processing and disposal) 
- controlled thermonuclear fusion 
-biology 
- instruction and additional training 
- dissemination of information 
- operation of materials-testing reactors (BR-2 
and HFR) 
- radioisotopes 
b) Euratom's direct action 
Total 
Amount 
(million u.a.) 
175.8 
69 
124.4 
4.3 
43.3 
96.1 
12.1 
10.0 
45.4 
19.6 
4.0 
10.9 
28.4 
4.8 
650.1 
%of 
total 
27.0 
10.6 
19.1 
0.8 
7.0 
14.8 
1.8 
1.6 
6.9 
3.1 
0.6 
1.7 
4.4 
0.7 
100 
60. Direct research is entrusted to the Joint Research Centre, which has developed 
the ORGEL project amongst others. The JRC comprises four establishments in 
different parts of the Community1 and has 2 250 employees. 
Ispra establishment, Italy: 1 610 personnel; 
European Institute for Transuranium Elements at Karlsruhe, Germany: 223 personnel; 
Petten establishment, Netherlands: 211 personnel; 
Central Bureau for Nuclear .Measurements at Geel, Belgium: 175 personnel. 
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The posltlve aspects of this action are backed up by a certain number of major 
achievements, which include: 
- the technical quality of the numerous items of work carried out at the Ispra 
centre and, under the Orgel project, the development of such complex units as the 
ECO critical assembly and the ESSOR specific test reactor, with the aid of numerous 
Community industries; 
- the work of the Ispra computer centre CETIS, which is mainly of a public 
service nature, in the form of back-up work for the Joint Programme and for the 
other research programmes in the Community as a whole. CETIS has also devoted 
part of its efforts to improving the disciplines based on its activities; 
- the quality of the work done by the Central Bureau for Nuclear Measurements 
(CBNM), which enabled American-Anglo-Canadian co-operation on nuclear measure-
ments to l:Je expanded to include the OECD countries. Thenceforth the Anglo-Saxon 
and European programmes were and are closely integrated within the European-
American Nuclear Data Committee; 
- the efficient conducting of the irradiation programmes in the Hoge Flux Reactor 
(HFR) by the Petten establishment; 
- the design and fabrication - within the specifications and the time limits - of 
the fuel for the MASURCA critical assembly by the European Institute for 
Transuranium Elements. 
In contrast to these positive achievements, mention must be made of the extremely 
serious difficulties encountered by the Commission in the management of the Joint 
Research Centre. The worst is the curbing of the JRC's growth, decided upon by the 
Council· during the second five-year period, which brought the personnel ceiling 
substantially below the figure originally planned. The result has been that certain 
of the Joint Research Centre's facilities are not being used to capacity. By way of 
example, here are some of the most pointed cases: 
- the CBNM's large accelerators, the programmes for which are overloaded, are 
only operating on a two-shift basis although such machines ought to be used round 
the clock, particularly as they age fairly quickly from the performance standpoint; 
- optimum use is not being made of the HFR reactor at Petten, because the 
establishment has not enough staff to prepare irradiation experiments quickly; 
- generally speaking, the establishments cannot make full use of the investments 
agreed to earlier on; this is particularly flagrant at the European Institute for Trans-
uranium Elements. The resultant situation bears unfairly on the staff and is ultimately 
prejudicial to the Community which provided these funds. 
e) Euratom's indirect action 
61. This relates essentially to the research programmes carried out under contract 
or association arrangements. 
The contracts and associations entered into by Euratom have mainly had the following 
objectives in view: 
38 
to co-ordinate the studies relating to proven-type reactors and nuclear marine 
propulsion systems; 
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to unite into an orderly European scheme the various research projects on: 
fast reactors, 
controlled thermonuclear reactions, 
nuclear biology and its applications; 
to support certain European initiatives such as pebble-bed reactors (AVR) and 
suspension reactors (KSTR); 
to promote collective enterprises that extend outside the Community (Halden and 
Dragon reactor projects); 
to call upon the competent public or private bodies of the Member States to 
assist in the JRC's own work, more especially on the ORGEL programme. 
On the whole, the technical quality of these tasks carried out by public or private 
research institutions in the Community has been recognized and has enabled sound 
relations to be established with non-Member States where nuclear development was 
particularly advanced (Canada, United States, Britain). 
Similarly, the Commission's ·management of these programmes has been generally 
appreciated. The integration of all the research programmes carried out in the 
Community in the field of controlled thermonuclear fusion, and likewise the tight 
co-ordination of a number of nuclear biology programmes, are typical examples of 
fruitful Community co-operation. In the same manner, the contracts concerning 
technological domains have helped to establish a number of more or less stable links 
between different industries. 
Nevertheless, apart from the technical results proper, these acttvtttes have had only 
a fragmentary sequel inasmuch as they could not be built into an overall strategy 
for the development of an industry integrated at Community level. Far from it, for 
under the pressure of the Member States, technical success was unable to prevent (or 
even induced) an increasing pursuit of individual interests. This is especially true 
in the essential sector of fast reactors, where association agreements were unable to 
check the crystallization of research, carried out chiefly in France and Germany, around 
two independent prototype reactor projects, entailing the duplication of large-scale 
equipment including the MASURCA and SNEAK critical assemblies, the high-power 
sodium loops, etc. As a result, very large appropriations had to be allotted to dupli-
cations - in any case premature - and to the purchase of a substantial amount of 
plutonium (500 kg) at a time when the market was at its most unfavourable 
(43 u.a./g). 
As for the Orgel project, it has so far not been able to take its place in a consistent 
development policy for heavy-water-moderated reactors, and yet the Community has 
devoted very large appropriations to it. This situation is mainly due to the fact that 
several Member States have engaged upon the development of various heavy-water-
moderated reactor versions outside the dovetailing action that the Commission had 
proposed by setting up, back in 1959, an ad hoc working party. 
d) Dissemination of information 
62. As part of the duties vested in it by the Treaty, the Commission established a 
policy for the dissemination of information and the protection of industrial property 
rights. 
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To provide for the circulation of the scientific results given in publications and 
reports, the Commission in 1959 set up the Centre for Information and 
Documentation (CID). 
Alongside this work, the CID undertook the development of a semi-automatic docu-
mentation system, and placed it at the disposal of interested parties. 
This system, whose value has been recognized, can be extended to other scientific and 
technical fields. 
Table IV gives an idea, through the number of reports, communications and patents 
filed, of the Community's activity as regards research. 
Table IV 
Publications 1 Communications ' I 
1958- 1963 325 596 
1964 888 321 
1965 1 012 332 
1966 1 336 297 
1967 I 396 402 
1968 ( I•t half) I 096 202 
Total 6 053 2 I50 
First filings 
of patents 
354 
149 
207 
I94 
17I 
79 
I I 54 
Document 
retrievals 1 
416 
267 
222 
4I8 
'I 154 
409 
2 886 
1 The term "publications" covers scientific and technical articles in periodicals and newspapers, oral expos~s, and 
"EUR" external reports; the Joint Research Centre's internal reports, which number roughly 1500, are not included in 
these figures. 
1 Communications concern non-published information; they are issued to the Member States and to persons and 
enterprises which can provide proof of a legitimate interest. 
1 The CID semi-automatic documentation system went into service towards the end of 1066, which accounts for the 
very sharp rise shown by the figures from that date onwards. 
3. Problems raised by the research carried out so far by Euratom 
63. As has been pointed out above, the inadequate co-ordination of all the research 
activities within the Community has introduced disruptive influences into the Joint 
Research Programme, particularly in the field of indirect action. These difficulties, 
which date from the first revision of the second five-year research programme in 1964, 
underlie the situation currently paralyzing the activities of Euratom. 
The principal factors responsible for this situation are the following: 
Restrictive application of the "fair return" concept 
64. Perhaps it is inevitable that every member of an organization such as the 
European Atomic Energy Community is tempted to secure the maximum return for 
his contribution and make certain above all that the dividends accruing to him from 
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his participation are greater than those which he could have anticipated from invest-
ment of the same capital in a scheme of a purely domestic nature. But the first 
difficulty is that of accurately assessing the profit obtained According to a very 
over-simplified concept, a balance has to be struck between the financial contribution 
to the Community budget and the corre~ponding expenditure made by the Community 
in the country in question. Yet this line of reasoning overlooks a number of aspects, 
among which might be cited the cumulative benefits which follow from being better 
informed on the research in progress and the working methods in use in the various 
Community laboratories, and again, the benefits derived from the development of 
scientific.information and knowhow acquired by the personnel engaged in Community 
tasks. 
It is nonetheless true that the value of research making a rapid impact on industry 
depends far more on the participation of specialized bodies and industries in research 
into and the construction of equipment than on the dissemination of information. 
Knowhow is the essence of the acquisition of knowledge which can be used by 
industry and can only be obtained through direct participation. The problem which 
arises for the third Community programme is to take due account of past experience 
and do away with the "fair return" in its unacceptable form of merely passing 
through the Community budget sums which in actual practice go towards the 
financing of unco-ordinated national programmes. 
The solution to this problem must be found in overall compensations striking a 
balance between the financial contributions of the Member States and a rational 
apportionment of the tasks to be performed. This balance would be more easily 
attained if it were no longer applied to nuclear research alone but extended to other 
sectors of advanced technology. 
Policy on research contracts 
In this field as well, a frank and open discussion of all the various "fair return" 
concepts would have certainly led to greater efficiency. 
To begin with, it might in certain cases appear justifiable to have adopted the 
principle of having research financed entirely by the Community in order to speed 
up the formation of a vast scientific and industrial research capability, but as this 
potential gradually develops it is reasonable to adopt the concept of a sharing of the 
expenses between the Community and the contracting party, in view of the profit 
which the latter can expect to derive from the increase in his resources and 
knowhow. 
During recent years, it has been possible to use the shared-cost contract formula 
almost exclusively to the extent to which the financing of the Community's co-contractor 
has been assumed by the public authorities (national centre or university, for example). 
Another difficulty derives from the fact that research contracts are frequently considered 
as simply a matter of acquiring results in return for payment. In fact, the value of 
a research project is not solely confined to obtaining results, but it also lies - and 
sometimes more so - in the knowhow which is acquired in the course of it. 
Consequently, in order to ensure that the Community derives genuine benefit from 
its research contracts, it is essential for members of its own staff and even workers 
seconded from other firms to be able to participate in the research in close collabora-
tion with the contractor's personnel. However, while the restrictions imposed on 
the size of its own staff has prevented the Commission from assigning Community 
staff to the majority of the contracts, industry has also shown itself to be reluctant both 
to second its own employees to the Community and to accept workers from other firms. 
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Role of contracts of association and participation 
66. The idea behind this rather specialized form of collaboration is to place certain 
big national projects on a Community footing and to avoid useless duplication of 
effort when such projects are under way concurrently in several countries. In order 
for the Community to have any real say in the orientation of the programmes, it 
would appear essential for it to provide a substantial contribution in terms of 
manpower and funds. 
The financial contribution has gradually decreased to the point where it is virtually 
non-existent in the majority of cases, despite the creation of equal-representation 
committees. But what is more serious still is that participation in terms of manpower 
has likewise dwindled. 
It has sometimes been claimed that the association form of contract was not effective. 
This is not true for long-term research, for no-one could conceivably challenge the 
correctness of the formula with regard to fusion or biology, except in those instances 
where the Community has not been able to delegate staff to an extent commensurate 
with its financial contribution. In other respects, the value of the technical results 
as a whole obtained under contracts of association is generally recognized. None-
theless, for the reasons outlined above, the associations have mainly met with 
difficulty when the sector concerned was one in which short or medium-term industrial 
applications were the likely outcome. 
The formula of contracts of participation has only been used in fact for the power 
plants to which the Community has granted financial aid, receiving in return access 
to the information derived from these projects. 
Here again, the value to the Community would have been much greater if both the 
manufacturers and the Community had used more staff, for the real advantage of 
operations of this sort lies in the creation of a specialized staff which has acquired 
thorough knowledge based on the inevitable daily incidents. In spite of this, contracts 
of participation helped industry at the time the first nuclear power plants were 
put up. 
Relative importance of guided or non-guided research 
in Community programmes 
67. By virtue of the tendency towards austerity to be discerned in the research 
budgets of the Member States, it has been recommended in certain quarters that the 
emphasis should be placed more on research directly relevant to the development of 
industrial applications which are commercially feasible over the short or medium 
term (guided research), though this might mean staggering other projects. It should 
nevertheless not be forgotten that the most fundamental research is the natural source 
of future developments and applications and that an abandonment or appreciable 
slackening in the pace of basic research would result in accentuating Western 
Europe's scientific and technical lag, and would encourage the brain-drain, which 
has been one of the major causes of this lag. 
68. In the nuclear sector, research and development is pursued, to a large degree 
at least, in centres having important installations and teams of researchers in widely 
differing lfisciplines. Most of these centres have been created entirely by the public 
authorities, who also assume the financing of their projects. This is the case with the 
Joint Research Centre. 
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Table V shows the personnel figures for the main Community research centres. 
Table V 
Staff of main Community research centres 
(not including personnel assigned to military activities) 
Centre I Approximate overall personnel figure 
Belgium 
CEN 1 100 
France 
Saclay, Fontenay-aux-Roses 7 000 
Grenoble 1 300 
Cadarache 1 500 
Italy 
Casaccia 1 200 
Bologna, Saluggia 300 
Nether lands 
RCN 800 
West Germany 
GfK 3 200 
KFA (Julich) 3 200 
Munich 1 200 
Total (1) 20 800 
Community 
Ispra 1 640 
Karlsruhe 223 
Gee! 175 
Petten 211 
Total (2) 2 249 
Total (1) + (2) 23 000 
69. The total body of researchers attached to these different nuclear centres constitutes 
in itself a considerable asset. From an analysis of the overall breakdown of the 
personnel of the national centres and that of the Joint Research Centre, according 
to whether the research is guided or not, the following main conclusions can be 
drawn: 
- contrary to what is generally accepted, the programmes of the Joint 
Research Centre are integrated to a greater extent than those of the national centres 
where specific technological targets are concerned; 
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- the number of researchers in national centres assigned to studies within loosely-
defined limits - but whose intrinsic value and interest are not in danger here - is 
very large. 
At the numerous discussions held between the organs of the Council and the Commis-
sion on the establishment of the programme of Euratom's future activities, certain 
Member States expressed their eager wish for an integration of research on the basis 
of well-defined objectives and the elimination of overlapping. 
These foregoing conclusions show that the problem is a general one and is more 
acute in the national centres than in the Joint Research Centre establishments. And 
this situation is rendered worse by the fact that much of the non-guided research 
does not fall within even a general framework. This leads to fragmented study 
involving many duplications and a good deal of "re-invention". 
All this points, then, to the need for co-operation between national and Community 
authorities with the aim of obtaining, under a comprehensive nuclear policy, proper 
apportionment of the research among the existing facilities and, by progressive 
reorganization of the nuclear centres, setting in motion the expansion and technological 
diversification which are so necessary to the Community. 
4. Conclusions 
70. The progressive shifting of nuclear research to the industrial plane necessitates 
a reorganization of research methods (technological and others) so as to focus on 
objectives geared to a unified energy policy and paying due heed to the basic 
requirements of a Community industrial policy. 
The lack of effective permanent harmonization between the Member States and the 
Commission has prevented this vital objective from being reached with the maximum 
advantages for the overall economy of the Community as well as the people. concerned. 
It has become clear that the role of the nuclear centres is all the more important as 
in general they have the large-scale equipment which is vital for technological tests. 
The optimum benefit to be derived from these facilities necessitates a fair apportion-
ment of the various tasks among the different Community centres on the one hand, 
and close co-operation between these centres and industry on the other, as well as a 
reorganization of the sector concerned. 
An analysis of past experience shows that such a policy would increase the efficiency 
of the research effort not only by the savings which it would bring about in the 
immediate future, but also by lowering the time-lag between invention and industrial 
application. 
Finally, all the difficulties set out above and in Chapter II have resulted in inadequate 
use of the combined research potential, and consequently a wastage of resources. The 
term "combined research potential" should be construed in its widest possible sense. 
It includes not only the equipment and research personnel of the Joint Research 
Centre but also, albeit in a very general way, the facilities for intra-Community 
co-operation in research and development, which have so far been largely untapped. 
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PART II 
General Aims and Proposals 
71. The critical analysis in Part I shows that what is being done by the Community 
institutions is calculated to enable the Community economy to reap a more substantial 
reward from the researches undertaken and the scientific and technical successes 
obtained. 
It is evident that in order to be effective and useful, any project in the nuclear field 
must fit into a Community-level framework of decisions or, at the very least, 
sufficiently specific guidelines concerning 
determination of the market prospects facing the Community's nuclear industries; 
encouragement of these industries to combine their forces in multinational 
companies; 
the mapping-out of a genuine reactor strategy in line with technical, economic 
and political factors: comparative profitability prospects, nuclear fuel supply 
arrangements, possibilities of industrial reorganization, etc.; 
the co-ordination of nuclear research and development programmes with a view 
to more balanced apportionment and better use of public funds. 
In the Commission's view, four types of action are of immediate importance; they 
are dealt within the four chapters of Part II and relate to: 
industrial promotion of reactors on a Community-wide scale; 
combining of national and Community research and development efforts in the 
reactor field; 
uniting of efforts as regards supply arrangements; 
co-ordination in nuclear research and allied fields. 
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CHAPTER I 
INDUSTRIAL PROMOTION OF REACTORS ON 
A COMMUNITY-WIDE SCALE 
72. Past experience and the present situation show that no further time must be 
lost in setting the industrial targets, preparing and selecting alternatives, and putting 
the right machinery in motion to carry them out. Even though these selections may 
rule out solutions that appear to be equally valid, the Community industry cannot 
exist without them. The targets must be set and the alternatives drawn up at 
Community level because none of the individual countries can offer a significant 
market for its domestic industry and thereby form a satisfactory launching ground · 
for external expansion. That is why the need for a common industrial policy is greater 
in the field of reactor construction and allied industries than anywhere else. This 
policy could develop along the following lines, certain of which can only be laid 
down in detail after wide-ranging consultations with experts from the Member States 
and with the sectors concerned. 
1. Target Programme 
73. In view of the promise offered by nuclear power as a new, cheap, stable source 
of energy, and by the development of the major role which, because of the Com-
munity's general energy context, it will be expected to play in meeting the ever-
growing demand for electricity, care must be taken to ensure that nuclear power takes 
its place among other energy sources under the best possible conditions. 
At present there is not enough information on the trend of the Community nuclear 
power plant market, a lack which prevents industrialists from developing a strategy 
for their investments and a commercial policy. The first need, therefore, is to give 
them as accurate a view as possible of the electricity market's overall require-
ments and the share that the responsible public authorities and electricity producers 
are earmarking for nuclear power in their power-plant construction programme. 
Consequently, the Commission considers it necessary to draw up, with the assistance 
of the electricity producers, an assessment of the future development of electricity 
generation for the whole Community. This assessment should not be simply a list 
of the six Member States' respective forecasts or programmes, but should afford better 
use in the Community of the various sources of energy for electricity production. 
When this overall assessment of electricity generation in the years ahead has been 
finalized, the Commission will have to prepare, with the assistance of all the interested 
parties (electricity producers, industrial sectors, various bodies) multiannual target 
programmes, to be reviewed regularly, specifying nuclear power's contribution to 
electricity output. This need is particularly real because the development of nuclear 
power for electricity generation demands a reactor strategy and concerted fuel manage-
ment in tune with the technical and economic facts of life. 
The influence of these target programmes on the nuclear power plant installation 
programme and on the Community's entire nuclear industry will only be really effective 
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if all the Member States and all the partners concerned are firmly convinced that 
the road to success must of necessity be sought in co-ordinated action at the Community 
level. 
2. Establishment of a common market for nuclear power plants 
7 4. The target programme must enable an estimate to be made of the nuclear power 
plant capacity that would be ordered in the Community. This medium-term estimate 
should be backed up with a statement by the electricity producers on their decisions 
regarding the power plants of all types that they have decided to order. At the start 
of each year, the nuclear power plant construction projects would be examined by -the 
Community authorities in consultation with the principal parties. Where such invest-
ments are concerned, this examination would usefully complement the communication 
procedure laid down in Article 41 of the Euratom Treaty, a procedure whose unduly 
short time-limits have so far prevented the Community authorities from fulfilling 
the role intended by the Treaty. 
This annual scrutiny of orders for power plants should make it easier to standardize 
the types, sizes and equipment used in the projects, a step which is urgently needed 
to enable the Community's industry to execute orders under more profitable conditions; 
it would be a valuable aid to industrialists in their technical design studies and would 
substantially reduce the expenses incurred by them in preparing tenders. 
At the present time, the diversity of industrial standards, especially for structural 
materials, seriously impedes the realization of a nuclear common market. Some 
progress has been made, and the rest must now be accomplished rapidly. Once the 
technical components are standardized, tenders should wherever possible be invited 
for the relevant projects and should be open to the whole of the Community industry. 
Thus the legal situation created by the nuclear common market would become a 
de facto situation. 
If the Community enterprises are to increase their strength, to combine in multi-
national consortia and to develop a commercial strategy, they must be able to count 
on a certain number of large-scale orders. It would probably be a useful step, there-
fore, if the responsible public authorities and/or the electricity producers were to 
pool all or part of their orders for the year, by groups of two to four power plants, 
as is now done in the United States. With the orders combined in this way, the 
manufacturers would be able to make their tender prices considerably lower and 
still be sure of a sufficient turnover to offset their investment and research 
expenditure. 
The predictable annual volume of orders would be such that participation by a 
number of industrial consortia in the construction of nuclear power plants could be 
envisaged on a rotational basis. The Commission should ensure that a monopoly 
situation does not arise and that the market remains properly competitive. 
3. Technical aid to nuclear power plant operators 
75. The pooling of experience, organized jointly by the Commission and the electricity 
producers, has enabled power reactor operators to cut out recurrences of technical 
obstacles and to co-ordinate their efforts to solve the technological problems inherent 
in the operation of power plants. 
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This co-operation has yielded such good results that it is considered advisable to 
continue and expand such technical aid to operators. 
Recent experience has shown the need for specific action to improve operating 
conditions so as to meet the producers' requirements. 
4. Aid to the nuclear industry 
76. As nuclear activities in the various Member States lead on progessively to 
industrial developments, whether it be in the erection of power plants in or outside 
the Community, it becomes more imperative to put into effect the general principles 
underlying the European Community. This applies particularly to assistance in the 
marketing and export of nuclear power plants, which hitherto has usually been 
granted on a national basis. 
It would in any case be essential to co-ordinate the various countries' aid systems 
within the Community. It may reasonably be asked, however, whether it would not 
be advisable to go further and set up a Community aid system which would partly 
replace the national measures and might take the form of a European Nuclear 
Industry Development Fund. The object of the Fund would be to promote the 
conditions under which European nuclear power could come into its own. It would aim 
at improving the efficiency of known or promising techniques and the transition from 
public to private financing. It would be a means of boosting and guiding industrial 
activity, and in particular could: 
- provide the financial security needed to cover certain exceptional technological 
risks still inherent in the nuclear field, which European constructors, owing to the 
limited scale of their finances, are scarcely in a position to bear; 
- assist in the connection of power prototypes to the grid, by helping to relieve 
the financial burdens involved; 
- contribute to any other major industrial project in the nuclear sector (e.g., 
uranium enrichment plant, heavy-water production plant). 
Another form of aid to enterprises which has already been employed is the granting 
of joint enterprise status. To what extent better use could be made of the advantages 
conferred by that status is a question which ought to be examined. Joint enterprise 
status and enjoyment of the Fund should be reserved for projects in respect of which 
an invitation for Community tenders is issued, or which at least form part of a 
common policy for development of the nuclear industry. 
77. The effort asked of the public authorities and utilities as regards forecasting 
and concerting their orders, and the financial support that would come from the State 
or Community authorities, should be matched by an effort to reorganize the Com-
munity's industry. For, fragmented as it is, it mostly has to rely on government 
subsidies, which accounts in no small degree for the fencing-off by each country of 
its own market. This is why the series of measures described above should be 
accompanied by a movement towards integration in the industry on the part of both 
the designers and the manufacturers of reactors or components. By combining, the 
industries would be able to strengthen their technical and financial basis and so to 
take certain risks, at the same time offering better price conditions, and this would 
certainly serve to widen the outlets for nuclear power plants both inside the Com-
munity and on export markets. 
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While such combinations must be encouraged, in principle it is not desirable for 
them to be effected on a mainly national basis. Complementarity in all branches 
of the industries in question cannot necessarily be found inside any one country. 
Industries should bear this in mind when seeking, in the Community as a whole, the 
most suitable partners for a profitable combination. 
The governments and the Community institutions ought to encourage this trend by 
. giving it their explicit approval and removing the obstacles of all kinds still present 
today. 
A movement on these lines would open up the way for the formation of a number 
of industrial consortia capable of meeting international competition and tendering 
under the best technical conditions, irrespective of nationality, for nuclear power 
plants in the Community. In order to stimulate the formation of such groups, the 
Community, for its part, ought wherever possible to give priority to the multinational 
groups thus established . as regards grants from the development fund. 
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CHAPTER II 
CO-ORDINATION FOR COMBINING THE NATIONAL 
AND COMMUNITY EFFORTS IN REACTOR RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
78. As was shown in Part I, the current situation of reactor research and development 
in the Community features a multiplicity of projects, mostly being conducted or 
planned on a national basis. The unco-ordinated pursuit of all these projects up to 
the stage of commercial manufacture would inevitably result in exorbitant expenditure 
and the marketing of too many types of power plant for the available outlets. 
Furthermore, as experience has shown, the fragmentation of research and technology 
work often leads to a splintering of industrial effort. Hence, as regards the develop-
ment of reactor types which will be used tomorrow for generating electricity but 
are still in a more or less advanced design stage, an immediate start must be made 
on opening up the way for a concentration of effort by selecting, in common, a 
certain number of projects. The lack of such selection in the past has detracted 
from the efficacity of research and from the growth of Community industry. 
It is difficult to carry out such a selection process at the present time. Generally 
speaking, the technological data available are often shaky, until confirmed or 
corrected by the building of a prototype, and in certain Ca$es the selection or rejection 
of this or that project is virtually a shot in the dark. These decisions ought to be 
based more especially on the answer to two questions: what importance is to be 
assigned to dependability of supply, and what place will breeders occupy? 
Even so, whatever efforts are undertaken need to be co-ordinated and smoothly 
meshed. In other words: 
- it is advisable simply to pursue the development of the most promising variants 
and to build prototypes only within the context of development programmes based 
on the potential and requirements of the Community as a whole; 
- programmes concerned with basic research on and development of components 
should be integrated and harmonized at Community level; 
- the close collaboration of the Member States' industries on the construction of 
prototypes and components which would be afforded by concerted utilization of 
official appropriations must be so planned that it will also warrant collaboration in 
the series manufacture of the reactor type evolved from these prototypes. 
Within the specific context of the Euratom Treaty, it is possible, by making use of 
the provisions concerning joint enterprises, to pursue common aims through the 
concerted action of national and Community public bodies and possibly of the 
industries concerned. From the financial standpoint, the relevant provisions permit 
of all possible apportionments amongst the participants, thus facilitating the pursuit 
of certain aims by the six countries jointly. 
By means of appropriate regulations laid down for the management of the joint 
enterprise, unity of action can be achieved while at the same time ensuring the 
necessary degree of autonomy for the individual programmes of the participating 
bodies. 
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This formula appears to allay most of the anxieties expressed in the Council's resolution 
of 8 December as to the forms of collaboration for researches that lead in the short 
term to industrial production, even when it is not possible for all the Member 
States to participate. Other research schemes could be the subject of complementary 
programmes, without necessarily using the joint enterprise formula. 
In fact, any complementary programme, whether or not in the form of a joint 
enterprise, must be tied in to the common programme, and for this purpose it must 
fulfil two basic conditions: 
- effective participation of the Commission; 
- the guarantee of the widest possible dissemination of information, with due 
allowance for the restrictions imposed by respect for industrial property rights. 
The fact remains, however, that the risk of fragmentation would not be eliminated 
by recourse to these formulas unless they were backed up by a common programme 
substantial enough to counteract the centrifugal forces. 
L Proven-type reactors 
79. A research and development effort is still needed in the case of proven-type 
reactors, so as to achieve greater reliability, lower priGes and gradual release from 
the shackles of external licences and processes. These technological researches are 
the industrialists' business; nevertheless, the Community's research centres can give 
such work useful support. Efficient circulation of the research findings amongst 
industrialists is still a major factor in the improvement of reactor technology in 
Europe. In addition, co-operation between industrialists to develop the principal 
components could be the first step towards subsequent integration. 
2. Breeder reactors 
80. Among the unproven types of reactor, the fast breeders are particularly promising. 
There is a consensus that the magnitude of the technological questions to be solved 
and the extent of the outlay required call for the immediate introduction in the 
Community of measures to co-ordinate and concentrate the programmes now going 
forward in the six member countries at both research and prototype level. Otherwise 
it would become impossible to attain the true objective of these programmes, which 
is to endow the Community with a strong industry free of all non-Community apron-
strings and capable of submitting competitive tenders for fast breeder power plants 
with a capacity of some 1 000 MW e. Furthermore, development must be geared 
to readiness for the commercial emergence of fast reactors towards 1980-1985, if 
the Community hopes to compete with the developments now going ahead in other 
parts of the world, particularly in Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union 
and Japan. 
As matters stand at present, two 250 MWe prototypes should shortly go into 
construction, one under the sponsorship of France, the other under that of Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands, who will probably be joined by Luxembourg. A major 
research programme centred on. the concept of pre-commercial 600 - 1 000 MW e 
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reactors and possible improvements thereto is in progress in various national centres 
in the Community. Independently of these operations, Italy has decided to build 
the PEC test reactor. 
If the present situation, characterized by the unco-ordinated development of three 
projects, should continue, it will be disastrous for the future of the Community's 
industry in this sector. Such fragmentation entails longer, more expensive research 
and may well cost Community constructors a place in the world market. 
81. Hence the Community's aim for this type of reacto!lmust be to arrive as quickly 
as possible at the first in a series, which would be a pre-commercial 600 - 1 000 MW e 
reactor. All roads to this objective are acceptable to the Commission provided that 
they really lead there, the joint enterprise being in this case the best vehicle. The 
characteristics of such an enterprise should be: 
unity of technical conception; . 
dovetailing of research efforts carried out in the Community; 
grouping together of the Community enterprises that desire to join in the 
project. 
This enterprise should enjoy the benefit of: 
the most important results from the two 250 MWe prototypes, with due regard 
for industrial property rights; 
the work and tools developed previously under contracts of association between 
the various Member States and Euratom; 
the joint use of all the test facilities already existing or the construction of 
which has been decided on; 
the design, development and utilization of any new test device or improved 
version of an existing device. 
If the Council failed to reach unanimous agreement on the principle of a joint first 
of a series and if the conditions set out above were not all met, then the formation 
of one or more joint enterprises would not make it possible to attain the industrial 
policy aims that the Commission deems essential. 
The negotiating of such a joint enterprise will necessarily take time. Pending comple-
tion of this process, the Commission cannot ask straight away for all the funds needed 
for its participation to be included in the programme. 
An immediate solution consists in: 
maintaining and strengthening the co-ordinating links between the different 
projects; 
requesting merely the funds required to keep the specialized team together and 
to ensure direct action for 1969. 
This is without prejudice to subsequent financial and technical participation by the 
Community in such a course of action. 
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3. Advanced converter reactors 
82. Where advanced converters are concerned, it is impossible to choose immediately 
from among the different systems. The choice cannot be deferred for very long, 
however, because the cost of developing all the envisaged systems or :variants up to 
the marketing stage would be prohibitive and would delay fruition of the Community 
efforts in a field where progress is equally rapid in non-Member States. Whilst 
the situation is relatively satisfactory with regard to the high-temperature type, where 
the differences only concern certain aspects connected with the reactor design, it is 
a different matter with the heavy-water systems. 
Here, as elsewhere, the Community's limited means oblige it to concentrate its efforts, 
which should ultimately lead to an industrial grouping in the high-temperature field, 
in which the aim is, as for heavy-water reactors, to push forward a single basic type. 
a) High-temperature gas-cooled reactors 
83. The European origin of this type of reactor, the favourable technical and 
economic prospects, and the good use it affords of fuel reserves warrant a united 
effort by the whole Community to carry out, as quickly as possible, all the 
work still needed to bring this system to complete maturity. This stage will 
be fully attained with the development of reactors capable of operating at temperatures 
high enough for the traditional steam cycle to be replaced by the new direct cycle 
with gas turbines operating in closed circuit in power plants of the order of 
1 000 MW e. It must be pointed out, however, that the operating of these reactors 
implies guaranteed access to a source of enriched uranium. 
The Community has participated in the development of the two high-temperature gas 
reactor variants that have been studied in Europe, both of which have reached the 
stage where the construction of power plants of several hundred megawatts can be 
envisaged. Most of the necessary technical developments are common to both 
variants. 
Under the Dragon project, the Community has collaborated in the construction and 
operation of the Dragon experimental reactor (20 MWth) and the development of 
designs for power reactors with prismatic elements. The international co-operation 
on this project gave birth to the company of Internuclear, incorporated as to 70% 
by Community shareholders (Belgonucleaire, Gutehoffnunghiitte, SNAM Progetti) and 
as to the rest by the British combine The Nuclear Power Group. This company 
intends to submit tenders to electricity producers very shortly. 
Within the THTR Association (Thorium High-Temperature Reactor), the Community 
has participated in the development of the second variant, with spherical fuel elements. 
The Brown Boveri (Mannheim) and Krupp companies have collaborated in the 
construction of a 15 MW e experimental reactor and have drawn up a 300 MW e proto-
type reactor project. 
On 22 May 1968, the German government requested the Member States to set up a 
co-operation arrangement to bring the high-temperature reactor system to full maturity. 
84. The setting-up of a European co-operation arrangement to deal with the whole 
of the research to be developed for this system is a fundamental aim. These researches 
should be co-ordinated and managed under a joint basic programme combining the 
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different measures taken or to be taken in the Community countries to improve the 
performances of steam-cycle power reactors and to develop the direct gas-turbine cycle. 
Here too, the Commission regards all routes to this target as suitable provided that 
they really lead there, the joint enterprise being one possible way of achieving the 
goal. Such an enterprise should have the same characteristics as those specified above, 
in Chapter II.2, for fast breeders. 
As early as 1969, a certain proportion of the JRC potential could be used for basic and 
back-up research of commqn interest to both the high-temperature gas reactor variants. 
In order to further the implementation of the various activities planned in the 
Community and to enable the Community industrialists to retain access to the Dragon 
reactor, under similar conditiqns to those afforded their opposite numbers in the 
United Kingdom, the Commission considers it is important to extend the Dragon 
Agreement beyond March 1970. 
b) Heavy-water reactors 
85. The interest of these reactors, whose industrial prospects have not yet been fully 
explored, lies mainly in the fact that th~y can be operated with natural or low-
enrichment uranium, which offers unquestionable advantages as regards supply arrange-
ments and the export prospects which hinge on them. One is bound to ask whether 
these reasons would not justify, from considerations of overall strategy, the develop-
ment up to a fully industrial stage of the most promising system and the setting-up 
of an appropriate heavy-water production capacity. The decision to build an enrich-
ment plant in the Community might alter the data underlying this problem. 
In the immediate future, however, it is very difficult to make a selection, based on 
objective data, from among the unduly large number of programmes being pursued in 
the Community. 
The aim, therefore, must be to prepare the ground for a selection by carrying out a 
thorough-going joint review of the problems raised by these different systems, with 
particular regard to the tender that a group of Community industrialists has undertaken 
to submit at the end of 1968 for the possible construction of an Orgel prototype. 
The Joint Research Centre possesses a body of skills and installations, and notably 
the ESSOR and ECO reactors, which will enable it to contribute decisively to the 
development of the various projects. 
4. Exploitation of research results 
86. The Community must continue to take the utmost care to ensure that research 
findings are efficiently passed on to the industry. 
Up to now, the Commission has had to confine itself to circulating the results of the 
Community research programme. But in the long term, owing to the complementary 
nature of this programme, this procedure would bring little profit to the Community 
unless it were accompanied by a far greater pooling of findings from the national 
programmes and by more technological exchanges amongst the industries of the six 
countries. 
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Indeed, the elimination of certain duplicate work through programme co-ordination 
is only acceptable if it is offset by the exchange of certain findings from these 
programmes. 
Scientific information methods themselves require constant improvement. The efforts 
of the Commission and the Member States in the documentation field should be 
continued and co-ordinated, so as to speed up and further simplify access to informa-
tion. It would probably increase their usefulness and lower the cost if they were 
to be extended to other sectors of technology. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONJUNCTION OF EFFORTS REGARDING 
SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS 
1. Common supply policy 
87. The dependability and stability of nuclear fuel supply arrangements are the 
main pillars of nuclear power development and, in consequence, of electricity produc-
tion. The Community must therefore conduct a common policy to ensure that all 
users receive a regular supply, free of discrimination as regards both prices and 
quantities, of ores, source materials and special fissile materials from both in and 
outside the Community. 
The lack of such a policy could have detrimental effects on the achievement of the 
Community's basic objectives by creating additional obstacles to the development of 
a European nuclear industry and engendering discrimination between users in access 
to resources. 
The Commission, in the context of determination of the energy policy, will make 
concrete proposals, aimed at achieving: 
the adoption of a common policy on nuclear fuel supply arrangements; 
encouragement of the prospecting of resources in and outside the Community; 
systematic diversification of external supply sources and improvement of nuclear 
fuel delivery terms. 
2. Industrial measures relating to supply 
88. Following the Council's resolution of 8 December 1967, an ad hoc group of the 
CCNR was asked to submit a report before the end of the year on long-term enriched 
uranium supply arrangements. This procedure will only make it possible to distill 
a viewpoint from the combined opinions of all interested sectors if information is 
available concerning the chief economic parameters. On the basis of the CCNR 
report, the Commission will put forward proposals on the subject. 
The studies performed to date show that, bearing in mind the rapid development of 
nuclear power and the increasingly clear-cut trend towards reactor types using enriched 
uranium, the isotope separation capacities now existing in the United States. will not 
suffice to cover the requirements of the Western world after 1975. It will thus be 
necessary for the Community to find other sources to meet its enriched uranium 
requirements. The question is whether the new uranium enrichment plants will be 
sited exclusively outside the Community or inside it as well. 
The most logical solution would be to build a Community plant that enjoys the 
advantages afforded by the provisions of the Euratom Treaty for enterprises of 
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Community interest. This project should give rise to industrial co-operation in the 
Community on a scale hitherto unknown among enterprises in various Community 
countries. 
Furthermore, it will be advisable to take steps at Community level to ensure optimum 
utilization of the fuel cycle, i.e., to have available, at the right time and in suitable 
capacity, fuel element fabrication plants, means of transport and irradiated fuel 
reprocessing plants, and facilities for disposing of and/or storing radioactive waste. 
Studies will also be needed to determine the procedures for the concerted management 
of nuclear fuels. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COMBINING OF RESEARCH EFFORTS 
89. In the research field, the Community's tasks can be classed in three categories: 
co-ordination of research programmes within the Community; 
execution of the Community's own research and develo~ment programmes; 
public service activities. 
Some of these different types of activity have given nse to increasing difficulties, 
whilst others have afforded general satisfaction. It should be pointed out that the 
ones most generally recognized as useful are those that do not lead to immediate 
industrial exploitation. Cases in point are research on thermonuclear fusion and 
biology, and that conducted by the Central Bureau for Nuclear Measurements. On 
the other hand, the severest difficulties have arisen in the research connected with the 
development of the various reactor systems. It is, in fact, just where relatively 
rapid industrial results could be expected that there has been found to be 
duplication between the different national programmes and also berween these and 
the Community programmes. In the case of fast reactors, certain Member States have 
actually launched several unco-ordinated programmes based on work carried out under 
Community projects. 
Thus the desire unanimously expressed by the Member States to lay the accent on 
research leading to industrial exploitation has in actual practice been travestied by the 
opposition to the implementation in the Community of programmes dealing with 
precisely that type of research. 
Hence the channelling of Euratom's activities into a path leading to better results 
from the economic and industrial standpoint can only be fully successful if an overall 
research strategy is steadily elaborated. It would also be advisable to consider in 
each case whether it is preferable to develop entirely new techniques or to rely on 
results already obtained elsewhere with a view to exploiting them independently. The 
absence of a strategy of this kind has too often obliged the Member States either to 
keep their sights low or to try, at the price of considerable difficulties, to make good 
ground already lost, particularly in relation to the United States. This strategy should 
enable the Community to acquire an equal or even superior position in certain fields by 
comparison with the other major industrial States, not only in technical knowhow, but 
also as regards industrial development. 
90. Whilst it is important to set the targets carefully, it is equally essential, once 
these have been adopted, to devote the necessary efforts to achieving them uninterrupt-
edly, so as to speed up industrial exploitation of research results. 
A rational nuclear programme must not only employ the means needed to achieve the 
objectives in the reactor field, but also include more general research and the tasks 
of public interest which involve the industrial utilization of nuclear techniques. This 
raises the problem of a balanced weighting of efforts within the overall programme. 
The desire to derive better industrial results from their research efforts, evinced in 
recent months by the Member States and shared by the Commission, should not 
cause us to overlook the importance of basic research. For the latter is the indispensable 
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source of all progress and the Community's only chance of retammg a pos1t1on 
commensurate with its capabilities amongst the other major economic powers. The 
remark applies to other research activities not directly connected with industrial 
programmes, e.g., in biology. 
91. These problems affect national and Community act1vtt1es to the same degree 
and their solution must therefore stem from a wide-scale co-ordination, which alone 
will open the way to substantially improved efficacity in the research efforts carried 
out in the Community as a whole. 
The experience of the last ten years has clearly shown that a Research Community 
could not confine itself to a common programme and a common budget relating to 
limited activities. From the fact that major efforts are pursued in the Member States, 
it follows that a true community necessarily involves concertation of its members' 
efforts so as to apportion the tasks in a way which will bring the greatest profit to them 
all. Any other conception cannot but be diametrically opposed to the very notion of 
"community"; common programmes and budgets are liable to lose their efficacity if 
they take the form of an excrescence - constantly disputed - by comparison with 
other, possibly diverging, concurrent programmes. 
92. These considerations do not apply to nuclear matters only; they also hold good 
for the other areas of technological research and development. The Community will 
have to see to it that consistent solutions are progressively worked out, the adoption 
of which will strengthen the overall efficiency. In particular, the "fair return" 
problem can only be solved by a reasonable compromise between, on the one hand, 
the aim of a rational share-out of research activities and their extension to the 
industrial sphere and, on the other hand, the desire to 1keep the interests of the 
different Member States satisfactorily balanced. Needless to say, such a balance will 
be the more easily determined as the range of activities widens. 
Similarly, particular attention should be given to the conditions under which exchanges 
and contracts could be intensified between research centres, universities and enterprises 
throughout the Community. The inadequacy of these links, indeed, accounts in no 
small measure for the lag behind the United States and for the attraction exerted 
by the latter on European scientists and research workers. The experience acquired 
by the Community in establishing profitable links between research centres and 
industry could be used to good advantage. Furthermore, the university reforms under-
taken in several Member States offer prospects which should be turned to account, 
especially by trying to lower or even do away with the present dividing walls. 
93. The proposals contained in this survey are intended to initiate the progressive 
incorporation of Euratom's activities into the context of the common policies which 
- in the fields of science, technology, industry and ene~gy - are now unanimously 
recognized to be necessary. 
In doing this, the Commission considers that it is pointing the way tp assuaging, in 
the area under consideration, the concern felt by the governments of the Member 
States. 
The indispensable co-ordination of research in the Community will be ensured by 
confrontation of the various programmes and also by implementation of the Community 
programme. 
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Programme confrontation, if it is to be effective, involves an effort of considerable 
proportions, for it is not a question simply of comparing the research subjects, but 
of deciding what are the true motives underlying each and every one of them and 
what scientific, technical and economic results can be expected from it. Only a 
through analysis of this kind will provide a reliable pointer to whatever co-ordina-
tion measures and specializations may be necessary in order to make the best use of 
the talents, time and resources available and to specify which projects are worth 
conducting at Community level. The Commission is resolved to develop this confron-
tation of programmes and means of execution, as it is in duty bound to do by Article 5 
of the Euratom Treaty and by the Council's Luxembourg resolution. 
94. The Joint Research Programme mapped out elsewhere maintains effective means 
of co-ordination, for instance, in the case of fusion and biology research. 
As regards the fast and high-temperature reactors, the Commission considers that 
discussions must be started as soon as possible on developing structures to provide 
the indispensable co-ordination in keeping with the proposals formulated in Chapter II 
of Part II. Meanwhile, until these structures are set up, the Commission proposes 
that the staff be kept on in their present posts, without any prejudice whatsoever to 
subsequent procedures for co-operation between the Commission and the Member 
States. With regard to heavy-water reactors, on the other hand, the ESSOR reactor 
and allied facilities available at Ispra, which can be used for experiments on different 
variants, hold out prospects of substantial activity at the Joint Research Centre. 
95. In addition to the activities carried on at the Joint Research Centre, mainly with a 
view to facilitating the future co-ordination of other, variously motivated, operations, 
certain proposals concern fields where the ultimate aims and the capabilities acquired 
warrant continuing or amplifying the projects in progress. This applies more especially 
to the proposals on condensed-state physics and direct conversion. 
It is, moreover, only reasonable that the public service role played by the Joint 
Research Centre in certain fields should be continued or intensified. This role is 
concerned more particularly with nuclear measurements, materials-testing reactors, train-
ing, and the dissemination of information. 
Lastly, for die centres to function properly there must be certain joint services, such 
as CETIS. The necessary machines and teams form a nucleus whose work could have 
a far wider range if certain additional means were available. Especially in the context 
of the existing activities, on automatic information processing or materials in particular, 
it might be found possible to give the Centre's activity a certain slant towards 
outstandingly important non-nuclear fields; however, specific proposals cannot be 
submitted until after a thorough study, at Community level, of the Member 
States' requirements and present research programmes in these fields and of the legal 
problems that arise in this connection. 
96. Turning to the immediate future, the proposal which the Commission sets out 
below - which draws largely on the experience of the past ten years - should 
enable the Council, whilst assuming the legal obligations vested in it by the Treaty, 
to lay down for Euratom a research programme keyed to continuity, progressive 
selectivity and optimum use of resources. The Commission's proposal deals with 
programmes covering various periods depending on their nature, so that changes of 
orientation will be possible where they prove necessary. In this way it ensures that 
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the scientific assets built up by the Community itself are utilized, and at the same 
time meets two basic conditions: 
the setting of medium-term targets, which alone can guarantee a minimum of 
continuity in the execution of projects; 
flexibility, which must be a dominant feature of any programme in so fast-
moving a sphere as that of scientific and technical research. 
97. The Commission is aware that the future of the Community's research centres 
is one particular facet of the far more general problem of the Community's scientific 
and technological development. 
It trusts that the Council will examine this problem in all its aspects and arrive at a 
concordant definition of the Community's objectives (as regards energy, industry and 
research) and a balanced, efficacious utilization of the resources, public and private, 
Community and national, at its disposal. 
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ACEC 
AEC 
AEG 
AGIP 
APDA 
AVR 
BBC 
BBK 
BR-2 
BWR 
CBNM 
CCNR 
CEA 
CEN 
CERCA 
CERN 
CETIS 
CID 
CIRENE 
CISE 
CNEN 
COREN 
EAEC 
ECO 
ECSC 
EL-4 
ENEA 
ENEL 
ENI 
ESSOR 
EUREX 
EUROCHEMIC 
FFTF 
FIAT 
FRAMATOME 
GAAA 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED 
Ateliers de Constructions Electriques de Charleroi 
Atomic Energy Commission 
Allgemeine Elektricitats-Gesellschaft 
Azienda Generale Italiana dei Petroli 
Atomic Power Development Associates 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Energieversorgungsunternehmen zur Vorberei-
tung der Errichtung eines Leistungs-Versuchsreaktors eV, Diisseldorf 
Brown, Boveri & Cie, AG, Mannheim 
Brown-Boveri/Krupp Reaktorbau GmbH, Diisseldorf 
Belgian Reactor 2, Mol 
Boiling Water Reactor 
Central Bureau for Nuclear Measurements 
Consultative Committee on Nuclear Research 
Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, France 
Centre d'etude de l'Energie Nucleaire, Belgium 
Compagnie pour l'Etude et la Realisation de Combustibles Atomiques 
European Nuclear Research Organization, Geneva 
Centre Europeen de l'Information Scientifique, Ispra 
Centre d'Information et de Documentation 
Clse REattore a NEbbia (fog-cooled reactor) 
Centro Informazioni Studi ed Esperienze, Milan 
Comitato Nazionale per l'Energia Nucleare, Italy 
Combustibile per Reattori Nucleari 
European Atomic Energy Community 
Experience Critique Orgel 
European Coal and Steel Community 
Heavy water reactor 
European Nuclear Energy Agency 
Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica 
Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi 
ESSai ORgel 
Orgel test reactor 
Enriched Uranium Extraction 
European company for chemical reprocessing of irradiated fuels 
Fast Flux Test Facility, USA 
Fabbrica ltaliana Automobili Torino 
French-American nuclear construction company 
Groupement Atomique Alsacienne Adantique 
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GfK 
GHH 
GKN 
HFR 
IAEA 
INIS 
IRI 
]RC 
KEMA 
KFA 
KKN 
KNK 
KRB 
KRT 
KSTR 
kWh 
KWL 
KWO 
MAN 
MASURCA 
MMN 
MTR 
MWe 
MWth 
MZFR 
NUKEM 
OECD 
ORGEL 
PEC 
PEON 
PFR 
PWR 
RAP SO DIE 
RCN 
RDM 
SEFOR 
SENA 
SICN 
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Gesellschaft fiir Kernforschung, Karlsruhe 
Gutehoffnungshiitte Sterkrade AG 
Gemeenschappelijke Kernenergiecentrale Nederland, Dodewaard 
Hoge Flux Reactor, Petten (high flux reactor) 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna 
International Nuclear Information System 
Istituto Ricostruzione Industriale 
Joint Research Centre 
NV tot Keuring van Elektrotechnische Materialen, Arnhem 
Kernforschungsanlage }iilich 
Kernkraftwerk Niederraichbach GmbH 
Kompaktes Natriumgekiihltes Kernkraftwerk, Karlsruhe 
Kernkraftwerk R WE-Bay~rnwerk 
Kernreaktorteile GmbH, Frankfurt 
KEMA Suspension Test Reactor 
kilowatt-hour 
Kernkraftwerk Lingen GmbH 
Kernkraftwerk Obrigheim 
Maschinenfabrik Augsburg Niirnberg 
MAquette SURregeneratrice CAdarache 
Cadarache breeder mockup 
Metallurgie et Mecanique Nucleaires (Dessel, Belgium) 
Materials Testing Reactor 
megawatt (electric) 
megawatt (thermal) 
Mehrzweck-Forschungsreaktor (multi-purpose research reactor) 
Nuklear-Chemie und -Metallurgie GmbH, Wolfgang bei Hanau 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
ORGanique Eau Lourde (heavy-water-moderated organic-cooled reactor) 
Prove Elementi Combustibile (fuel-testing reactor) 
Commission pour la Production d'Electricite d'Origine Nudeaire, France 
Prototype Fast Reactor, Dounreay, Scotland 
Pressurized Water Reactor 
Reacteur RApide refroidi au SODium (fast sodium-cooled reactor) 
Reactor Centrum Nederland 
Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij NV 
Southwest Experimental Fast Oxide Reactor 
Societe d'Energie Nudeaire Franco-Beige des Ardennes, Chooz 
Societe Industrielle des Combustibles Nudeaires, Paris 
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SNAM-Progetti 
SNEAK 
SNR 
SOCIA 
SUSPOP 
tee 
THTR 
TNPG 
u.a. 
USAEC 
WAK 
64 
Societa Nazionale Amministrazione del Metano (belongs to IRI) 
Schnelle Null-Energie-Anordnung, Karlsruhe (fast zero-power assembly) 
Schneller Natriumgeki.ihlter Reaktor (fast sodium-cooled reactor) 
Sociche pour l'Industrie Atomique 
Dutch suspension reactor project 
tonnes coal equivalent 
Thorium Hochtemperaturreaktor 
The Nuclear Power Group (United Kingdom) 
units of account 
US Atomic Energy Commission 
Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage Karlsruhe 
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